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# SOCIALIST REVIEW

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# THE END OF DIRECT RULE

IN October, 1974, and after nearly 50 years of continuous rule in Northern Ireland by the Unionist Party, and six years of struggle for civil rights, i.e., since October, 1968, the latter period accompanied by much violence originally initiated by the ruling faction, one could ask: Were the authors of the Government of Ireland Act sincere when they spoke of "better Government in Ireland" and did they really have the intention to persuade all sections of the Irish people, through a Council of Ireland, to create "a bond of Union" that would terminate the divisions legislated for and establish a single Parliament in the country? The actions taken before the Act was finally passed, inside and outside the Westminster Parliament, leave one with little confidence that such sincerity and intention were present. Viewing the long history of previous English Administrations in Ireland, based on the imperial dictum of "divide and rule", and understanding the nature of imperialism which never willingly gives up its conquests, it was realistic to appreciate that little would be done to "persuade" the people of the six north-east counties of Ireland, i.e., Northern Ireland, to find a common platform with the rest of Ireland, which had moved further along the road contemplated by the Act of 1920 along the path of independence and political freedom.

## NEO-COLONIALISM

A further consideration, for the English Administration, was that, by the division of Ireland, there would exist a stranglehold on the economic development in the rest of Ireland and continuing financial control by London. This was accepted by the Irish capitalist class whose interests were served by preventing the social forces, i.e., the working class and small farmers who were the backbone of the independence struggle, taking the struggle forward in their interest. In the latter decision both the British imperialists and Irish native capitalists mutually concurred and Irish capitalism accepted, for the rest of Ireland, what became known in later years as a neo-colonial status. Thus British imperialism secured a colony in Northern Ireland and adopted and maintained a neo-colonialist attitude towards the rest of the country.

The Northern Ireland State was totally subordinate to Westminster. It was forbidden to deal with matters of "Imperial concern" and these included:

the Crown, the making of peace or war; the naval, military or air forces, and the defence of the realm; the election laws and laws relating to the qualification of Parliamentary electors, so far as they relate to the election of members returned by the constituencies in Northern Ireland to the Parliament of the United Kingdom; relations with foreign States or with other parts of the British Empire; alienage and naturalisation; trade with places outside Northern Ireland; submarine cables; wireless telegraphy and aerial navigation; lighthouses; coinage; legal tender; negotiable instruments; trade marks; copyright and patent rights. Matters falling within the sphere of "reserved (to Britain) taxation" included income tax; the postal service; the Post Office Savings Bank and Land Annuities, etc.

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By **BETTY SINCLAIR**

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The Northern Ireland Parliament was given power to make laws for "the peace, order, and good government" in matters relating exclusively to Northern Ireland, but could not make laws in matters excluded, and listed above, which were of Imperial concern.

It is evident, from all the above, that the State which was set up under the Act of 1920 enjoyed no form of sovereignty and was intended to remain under Westminster control.

## RELIGION

The Act of 1920 prohibited the Stormont Parliament from making laws so as to interfere with religious equality, ". . . as for instance, establishing or prohibiting the exercise of any particular form of religion, or making a discrimination as respects State aid between schools of different religious denominations". Nor were laws to be made that would discriminate against persons of different religious beliefs, or to give preference to any such persons. (Special safeguards were included in favour of Queen's University of Belfast, the Order of Freemasons, and existing or pensioned officers of local authorities.) The British Act of 1920 wrote into the English Statutes the religious differences that existed in Ireland and deliberately excluded the national differences. Thus it was that a Westminster Parlia-

ment set the seal on religious bigotry and sectarianism and sowed the seeds of divisions in Northern Ireland which have continued to sprout until the present day.

It was unnecessary for the Stormont Parliament to pass any laws openly discriminating against persons of different religious beliefs; in this case, nearly 34 per cent of the population who were Catholics. With control of the central State and the overwhelming majority of the 78 local authorities (an in-built majority in all cases), control of personnel, control of local authority and private dwellings, control of the major sectors of industry and commerce, etc., it was comparatively easy to ensure that political or religious "enemies" were prevented from obtaining any substantial foothold in any of the political, industrial, economic, social or cultural spheres. The ruling Unionist Party, i.e., the landlords, linen-lords, those who controlled the shipyard, railways, distribution and commerce, accepted colonial status, under the Act of 1920 and, at a time when other nations and people were struggling to throw off the colonial yoke, they accepted that yoke willingly. The forces of Protestant-Unionist Irish capitalism, by their reactionary leadership in the years from 1912 to 1920 (and in the years that followed) succeeded in betraying the best interests of the Protestant section of the working class in Ireland and robbed them of a country, history and culture . . . this section of the working class were turned into an "alien element" in the country of their birth, Ireland, and have never been accepted in Britain as "British".

It suited the British ruling class to thus "settle" the Irish question: that the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, including the working class, should believe, and act, as if they were the real rulers of the State. At no time was it clearly revealed by the leaders of the Unionist party that they were not so. Section 75 of the Act of 1920, which states: "*Notwithstanding the establishment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, or anything contained in this Act, the supreme authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters and things in (Northern) Ireland and every part thereof,*" was well hidden. The "rulers" were ruled and did not know it.

## DIRECT RULE

In March, 1972, the Unionists who had "ruled" and ridden roughshod over their political opponents found themselves in the same disadvantageous posi-

tion as their "political enemies". A British Tory Government, faced with continuing struggles for Civil Rights, refusal of the Unionists to implement the innocuous reform programme drawn up by the Wilson Government in 1969, the resignation of two Northern Ireland Prime Ministers, the re-introduction of internment without trial and ever greater violence, was forced, in the interests of British financial commitments in the area and loss of international prestige, to dismiss the Stormont Administration, remove what little powers the latter had, and institute Direct Rule from Westminster. The circle was complete. Westminster "gave" and Westminster had taken away and now all the people of Northern Ireland, Loyalist and non-Loyalist alike, and especially the former, began to understand that real power lay in London.

The reaction of the ultra-Unionists was swift but not too certain. By 1972, control of industry, commerce, insurance, banking and the finance houses had passed out of local control. Some 63 per cent of all manufactured goods went to the British market and two-thirds of agricultural output. British monopoly capitalism controlled 45 per cent of the larger manufacturing companies, the U.S.A. 20 per cent, other than E.E.C. countries 10 per cent and only 22 per cent remained in local control. The same ratio of ownership and control applied to the smaller manufacturing units, i.e., firms with from 250 to 500 employees. The "link with Britain", in the previous two decades, had brought about the merging of 17 medium and large manufacturing companies with multi-nationals outside Northern Ireland; control of production, exchange and distribution no longer rested with those who were still demanding the "right" to "control" Northern Ireland.

In those heady days of March, 1972, Craig's Vanguard party's call for U.D.I. met with opposition from Faulkner, who had already sold out his manufacturing interests to Carrington Viyella, and others whose fortunes were now bound up with British and other multi-national corporations. Craig tried to produce figures to prove that the area was profitable and could, therefore, stand on its own, if the Loyalists were of a mind to challenge Westminster.

## GREEN PAPER

By September, 1974, when the British Green Paper on Finance and the Economy of Northern Ireland appeared, it was obvious that the economy of the area was so entwined with that of Britain that no clear proofs could be established, one way or the other. The Green Paper stated: ". . . there were

## REFERENDUM

no authoritative statistics of the value of investment of Great Britain companies in Northern Ireland, or by Northern Ireland companies in Great Britain. Similarly there are no authoritative statistics of the flow of dividends and interest payment between Great Britain and Northern Ireland." (p. 12). Further: "It is not possible to make definite statements about Northern Ireland's balance of trade with countries other than Great Britain because the necessary statistics are not established." (p. 11). According to the Green Paper, the only statistics that could be "established" were that, in the year 1973/74, the Northern Ireland Exchequer had received £313 million from the United Kingdom in order to keep it going and the Northern Ireland Public Debt stood at £627 million, of which £424 million consisted of "advances from H.M. Treasury".

The assets of the Northern Ireland Consolidated Fund to the same amount, i.e., £627 million, consisted of loans and advances to the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, Government Loans Fund, former Development Commissions and the Northern Ireland Finance Corporation . . . most of which "assets" were spent or already committed. The Unionists, having committed the people, supporters and non-supporters alike, to the embraces of union with Britain, found, when Westminster had drawn up the "balance sheet", the cupboard was bare and what did appear to exist in the way of tangible assets did not belong to them. After all the years of Unionist rule, all classes in Northern Ireland found themselves poorer than in 1920 and in total thrall to Westminster and British monopoly capitalism. The dream of U.D.I. was no longer a feasible proposition—especially for the Craigs who had no intention of fighting the monopolies.

The British Tories, having delivered the coup de grace to their former Unionist supporters, with the aid of Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Whitelaw, looked for new ways and for new forces to continue British rule in the area. The hunt went on for "centrists" among Protestant and Catholic politicians who would walk a "middle road" towards a British solution. By December, 1973, the Sunningdale Agreement was launched to provide for "power-sharing"—between the Faulkner Unionists, Alliance Unionists and the Social Democratic and Labour Catholic middle-class representatives—and a Council of Ireland. The latter purported to emphasise an "Irish dimension" and the political aspirations of the S.D.L.P. but was, in reality, a major plank in British policy since the British decision was taken to enter the E.E.C. and bring the whole of Ireland with her.

During 1973, a referendum was held to "allow the people" of Northern Ireland to decide whether or not they wished to remain within the U.K., or unite with the Irish Republic. The referendum was universally boycotted by all the anti-Unionist forces. It was a "Yes" or "No" effort and the result could not have been taken as an indication of the real pulse of the situation. The referendum was followed by elections for 26 District Councils and a Northern Ireland Assembly . . . legislation for both not having yet been completed at Westminster! By December, Whitelaw succeeded in selecting an Executive to run the Assembly and in January, 1974, it began to function. The ultra-Unionists, led by Craig, Paisley and West, refused to take part in talks about the formation of the Executive; they refused to accept the one which was drawn up and pledged that they would bring down the Executive and Assembly. Their demand was for a return to the Stormont Parliament of 1968, with full control over the police and restoration of the "B" Specials.

Among the forces of anti-Unionism neither the Assembly nor Executive found much favour. It was a weak structure and could not stand up against the realities of the situation. By May 29, the ultras, with the aid of the Ulster Workers' Council having enforced a stoppage of industry, etc., for the previous 14 days (and the supine handling of the neo-fascist challenge by the Wilson Labour Government, the overt sympathy shown for the ultras by the British Army, the R.U.C., mass media, top civil servants, and not least the Confederation of British Industries) the Executive and Assembly came tumbling down. The third "Irish settlement" came to naught and direct rule was re-introduced; this time by a Labour Government.

Following the British General Election of October 10, it is difficult to envisage how direct rule will end in the given economic and political climate, with undeclared military rule, and the disposition of the political forces.

The Faulknerites have the appearance of a spent political force. The West, Craig, Paisley parties are attempting to create a united front under the umbrella of the United Ulster Unionist Council, allied with the British fascist National Front and British Tory Enoch Powell, as well as most of the para-military organisations on the extreme right and the so-called Ulster Workers' Council. The U.U.U.C. won 11 of the 12 Westminster seats at the February General Election, won 10 on October 10, and have used these election battles as trial runs

for the promised elections for a Consultative Convention, to take place at a future date as yet unspecified.

The Wilson Government, through the Northern Ireland Office, shortly after the re-imposition of direct rule, issued a White Paper proposing the election of a Consultative Convention which "would enable the people of Northern Ireland, through their elected representatives, to discuss what should be done to find a solution". British spokesmen stated that it "was up to the people" here to find that solution and they would be given "the tools" to do so. What those tools will consist of, has not yet been revealed. The promise was made that a Green Paper on the Economy would be issued and this, as stated, has appeared. It is a very revealing document showing the unremitting neglect, by the British Administration, of the welfare of the people of Northern Ireland and, not least, as has been pointed out above, the total financial dependence of the area for jobs, homes, social security and social services on a British Exchequer and British monopoly capitalism. Two further Papers are promised, i.e., "The Working of the Convention" and "Forms of Power Sharing in Other Parts of the World". The British Administration is searching the rag bag of her former colonial empire to find a formula to enable her to continue colonial rule in the Six Counties—a formula which she hopes will satisfy a significant section of the people—and allow matters to proceed as heretofore.

## BLINDNESS

Such blindness, after the political upheavals in Northern Ireland over the past six years, can only be exhibited by people who are really blind to all the lessons of history, and which should have been learned after the years of forced dismemberment of the British Empire. The Unionist ultras have made clear that they are not interested in any form of "power-sharing", whether it may have worked in Timbuctoo or Toronto. They have declared that they will accept nothing less than a return to the old Stormont structure with themselves in the seat of power. What they propose comes near to a demand for the setting up of a fascist State in Northern Ireland, having made it clear, in their oft-repeated statements, that those who would aspire to a unity of Ireland had better live their lives elsewhere, or else.

There can be little more room left for political or other manoeuvring on the part of the British Government that was elected on October 10. The ultra

Unionists are girding their loins for the Consultative Convention elections and are, under Powell pressure, demanding 21 seats in the British House of Commons. By fair work, or foul, and mostly the latter, they are determined to come out with an over-all majority of seats in the Convention and, in that setting, put the screw on Britain. Already threats have been made by Craig and others to repeat the U.W.C. stoppage and again paralyse the economy of Northern Ireland. No one can guarantee that they would not again, as in May, receive the covert and overt support of the British Armed Forces in such an action. The result could, with a weak British Government, bring neo-fascist reaction into the seat of whatever power may be allowed in Northern Ireland, or wrested from Britain.

There could be another perspective. A British Administration, instead of searching their archives for "examples of Power-Sharing" (most of which have been thrown into the dustbin of history by the countries and peoples concerned), could take steps to ensure a democratic future for the area. As a first step, and in order to assist the democratic forces here (as well as in the rest of Ireland and Britain itself) they should come to a decision to end internment without trial forthwith. This should be followed by a repeal of the Emergency Provisions Act, an end to military harassment and withdrawal of all British troops to barracks, disarming of the police force and the introduction of legislation at Westminster for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. In this way, the scene could be set for the devolving of real powers which could be properly and democratically shared by all the democratic forces, and which would call for real responsibility inside Northern Ireland to be exercised for and on behalf of the people for the future. The way could be paved for the final settlement of the British-Irish question, if the forces in Britain and Westminster have the will.

The Wilson Labour Government have made proposals for elected Assemblies for Scotland and Wales; the former to have law-making powers on a restricted basis and the latter to be denied any law-making powers at all. These proposals do not even come up to what was asked for in the Kilbrandon Report (the latter, unfortunately, did not accept the P.R. method of voting). The Kilbrandon Committee did take Northern Ireland in in their studies and researches but, to date, no statement on their findings has yet been made by the British Government. The proposed Consultative Convention will meet the same fate as the short-lived Executive and

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# THE ROOTS OF COALITIONISM

"At last the Labour Party can justly claim to be the focus of the Left in Ireland." — "Labour in Irish Politics, 1890-1930," by Arthur Mitchell.

**T**HIS last sentence in Dr. Mitchell's book can be seen as a piece of wishful thinking. It seems that so many opportunities have been lost in the past 60 years by Irish Labour that surely now there must be a chance that it will prove effective.

In fact, as its last Conference shows, the Irish Labour Party is now even further from playing an independent role in Irish politics than ever before.

In examining the failure of the Irish Labour Party to play anything but a secondary role in Irish politics it is often forgotten what type of a party it is. It is judged as if it were a party wanting socialist revolution which had failed through bad tactics. In fact it was as a broad reformist party, including revolutionaries, that the party emerged in 1912. James Connolly and the others who proposed its foundation thought that Home Rule was coming and saw the necessity for a Parliamentary Opposition in the new Home Rule Assembly.

## OPPOSED WAR

As it became clear that Home Rule was dead, after the outbreak of the First World War, the Labour Party as such played virtually no role in the developing situation. Connolly had declared on the outbreak of war that he supported the position of the international socialist movement that the world war should be turned into a war by the workers within each country against their own capitalists. In the case of Ireland this meant primarily a fight against the British capitalists.

But, as had also happened in 1913, it was not through the Labour Party or the Irish Trade Union Congress that the struggle developed. In 1913 neither played any significant role. It was Connolly through his paper, the "Workers' Republic", who put the political viewpoint up to 1916.

## REFORMS

In 1915, during the municipal elections, the Dublin Labour Party put forward a programme of reforms in public housing, social services and education.

Under pressure from the Dublin Trades Council the Irish Trade Union Congress and Labour

Party did support Thomas Farren as a Labour candidate in a Westminster Parliamentary election in June 1915, when he ran on an anti-war platform. He had Connolly's active support and did surprisingly well against an Irish Parliamentary Party candidate.

Later in the same year Connolly was against putting forward a candidate for the Harbour constituency in Dublin. He saw the Irish Citizen Army, not the Labour Party, as the vehicle through which Labour's ideals must be put forward.

## BRITISH LABOUR

It is and was the peculiarity of the Irish Labour Party that it was formed in the image of the British Labour Party. Ireland's unique position as a colony was that it was a European colony with many of the same features as its oppressor.

The lack of interest in politics and ideas of the British Labour movement was reflected in the Irish Labour movement, which was in many cases an offshoot. There was not the same alien feeling which existed in other colonies.

Even after 1916 the Trades Union Congress took no stand on the national issue. It is too easy to put this down to the quality of the leadership. Even if

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By A. RAFTERY

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they had not got Connolly's revolutionary clarity many of them had stood close to him. Their weakness was that they reflected the views of their membership rather than giving leadership.

Connolly's position in the Labour movement had been a minority one, politically. He had tried to show the connection between what seemed to the majority, both in the labour and Nationalist movements, as conceptions which were diametrically opposed. Internationalist socialism and nationalism as part of the same ideology!

Sean O'Casey probably reflected the typical Dublin working-class reaction. Nationalism had nothing to do with the everyday struggle. What O'Casey failed to see was that it's possible to function at two levels and that a worker who would fight the employer on the wages front and be suspicious of a Labour man who put forward ideas

about Irish independence, would vote for a representative of the employers who put forward nationalist ideas.

The divorcing of the economic struggle from the political struggle, typical of the British Labour movement, had penetrated the Irish Labour movement and rendered it impotent. The relationship between the development of the Irish and British Labour movements has not been sufficiently explored. There is a tendency to see them in isolation whereas since the histories of both islands are inextricably interwoven, so are the histories of their Labour movements.

The fact that Irish Labour showed certain features of British Labour has had both negative and positive effects. It was harmful insofar as it tended to divorce the Labour movement from the national struggle but in the period of intense ideological reaction it prevented the complete submergence of the trade union movement in the reactionary tide.

## CIVIL WAR

During the period of the Civil War and the early years of the Free State, under the leadership of Thomas Johnson and Cathal O'Shannon, the divided nature of Irish Labour was expressed in a very sharp way. On the one hand there was support for Socialism and the Soviet Union in its paper the "Voice of Labour". On the other hand there was its attitude towards the forces which were at war within the country.

On July 22nd, 1922, the "Voice of Labour" said:

"Many people on both sides are displaying the most venomous enmity to the Irish Labour Party. Why? Because Labour refuses to line up with either party in the civil war.

"Labour dares to be independent."

## INEFFECTIVE

In fact Labour was accepted as "neutral", that is, politically ineffective. Instead of putting forward a policy the Labour Party called for "peace" and tried to call an abortive Mansion House meeting of all T.D.s. Since the struggle in the country was not between "the masses and the classes" it was presumed to be no concern of the working class. At the T.U.C. on August 7, 1922, Cathal O'Shannon summed up his view of why Labour had failed. He said:

"Our defeats have been due to three main and one minor cause." The three "main" causes were "faulty industrial organisation, poor generalship and

let us not hide it from ourselves, lack of fighting spirit and vision on the part of some sections of our rank and file. The minor cause is the reaction of the political and military situation."!!

This analysis is a classic summing-up of what might be described as the pseudo-class position. The entire political situation, the struggle in arms between pro- and anti-imperialist forces are relegated to a minor role while the alleged lack of militancy of the rank and file causes storm clouds to darken the horizon. This retreat from reality was presented as a revolutionary standpoint. The struggle for a Workers' Republic was not going on, therefore it was no concern of the workers.

This attitude, allegedly independent, in fact relegated Irish Labour to a permanent secondary role in the political life of the country. Since the tasks confronting the people were not Socialist tasks at that time the logic was to let the capitalists get on with building a capitalist society and fight them on the economic front.

In developing countries today the progressive movements support the development of native industry. In the 26 Counties industry developed with the Labour movement having no clear policy towards it except to fight the bosses.

The Shannon Scheme was built in deliberate conflict with the trade union movement. The Free State Government was determined to use the depressed state of the economy to keep wages as low as possible. This policy was fought on the economic level by blacking the Shannon Scheme for a couple of months but no attempt was made to present an alternative way in which industry could be developed in Ireland.

## RADICAL CAPITALISTS

The policies for the development of the Irish economy were left to the more radical representatives of the capitalists who formed Fianna Fáil. The Irish Labour Party not only did not advocate tariffs but had no great liking for them. This was explained on the pseudo-socialist ground that they only benefited the capitalists. In this way the struggle against capitalism was presented as taking precedence over the struggle against imperialism.

It must be said here that not only the Labour Party but also the Left made this same mistake. Instead of seeing the different class forces which were engaged in struggle the formula "Tweedledum and Tweedledee" was used to describe all those forces outside the working-class and the small farmers.

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# AFTER CHILE

By George Jeffares

THE overthrow of Chile's Popular Unity Government in September 1973 carries important lessons for the peoples of the world, and for the Communist and Socialist movements in particular. For millions of ordinary people the events in Chile were an eye-opener, showing that the capitalist class, for all its protestations about human freedom and the dignity of the individual, is itself the enemy of all freedom, and does not hesitate to drown in blood the freedom of the workers and peasants once its own positions of power, privilege and profit are threatened.

The role of the U.S. in the destruction of democracy in Chile is a warning that, in spite of international détente, imperialism—wherever the balance of forces permits—is ever ready to intervene against a nation struggling for its independence and social progress.

The version of events in Chile put out by the capitalist news media would have it that the Allende Government fell because it had failed to win the support of the working class or to better their lot—which is to ignore the immense achievements of Popular Unity and the gains made by the workers and poor peasants, which, despite the galloping inflation, were largely maintained throughout the Allende period. In support of their case, the newspapers at the time instanced the number of anti-Government strikes, omitting to mention that with the exception of the copper miners' strike, these were strikes by propertied elements, such as lorry-owners—which it has since been admitted was financed by the C.I.A.

The bourgeois press account of what happened in Chile has a double purpose: to justify the *coup d'état* which overthrew the elected Government—and to serve as a warning to other peoples against trying a similar experiment. Forgetting to mention that in Allende's Chile the capitalist class enjoyed total freedom of opposition, including domination of the news media, the lesson they would like drawn from Chile is that you can't have both Socialism and freedom, that you have to choose between revolution and democracy. And this is a view that finds curious echoes on the part of some elements on the Left, who argue that Chile proves that the revolutionary transformation of society can only be brought about by violence.

The summary executions in the streets of Santiago of Allende supporters have their parallel in the summary judgments passed on Popular Unity by "Left"

opponents of the Chilean road to Socialism. The victory won by the combined forces of internal reaction and U.S. imperialism has been greeted by the ultra-Left as conclusive proof of the inevitable bankruptcy of the democratic, multi-party path to Socialism.

No doubt after the collapse of the Paris Commune a century ago and the bloody massacre of the Communards, there were many who concluded that it was the *armed* struggle which could never be successful in bringing about Socialism. They were proved wrong in 1917.

Similarly, what happened in Chile does not, in our view, invalidate for one moment the concept of a democratic, multi-party road to Socialism, with the exclusion of civil war.

In the fullness of time a deep-going, detailed analysis of the achievements and mistakes of Popular Unity will be made by those best qualified to do so—the Chilean Communists and Socialists and their allies in government. In the meantime, it is important for Communists, Socialists and anti-imperialists everywhere to try and draw some lessons from Chile in the light of the conditions of their own struggle.

While attempting this task, it is very important to keep in mind some features of the situation that are specifically Chilean, for example, the circumstances in which Popular Unity came to hold Governmental power—circumstances which are not likely to be repeated in other countries. Salvador Allende was able to become President with only 36% of the vote, because of the specific nature of the Chilean constitution. As a result, the Popular Unity Government was thwarted at every turn by a parliament the majority of which was opposed to it—it was not exactly a case of the Left winning a majority in parliament and compelling the capitalists and landlords to respect the laws of the land!

## POPULAR SUPPORT

But it is true of all countries—and irrespective of whether it is the "peaceful" or the armed road to Socialism that is taken—that Socialism cannot triumph unless it wins the active support of the vast majority of the people, a support that is reflected in the favourable composition of parliament, and—something even more important—in militant support in the streets. A socialist government, even if it

comes to power due to exceptional circumstances as in Chile, unless it wins the support of the majority is wide open to losing that power as quickly as it won it. And although Popular Unity was on the way towards achieving that position—its vote went up from 36% in 1970 to 44% in the 1973 elections—it remained a minority government, not having had the time to win the majority backing that would have made it impossible for reaction to have carried out the military coup.

## ALLIES

The question of winning allies for the working class at all stages of the revolution is of vital importance. And Chile is rich in lessons on this matter. In the period when Popular Unity was carrying out measures of an anti-imperialist nature—e.g., nationalisation of the foreign-owned mines—it was able to win nationwide support for such measures, which even the Christian Democrat Party had to support. But a combination of highly unfavourable internal and external factors—the particular vulnerability of the economy to U.S. pressures, the immense size of the middle class compared with the working class and peasants—made it a complicated and difficult task to win sufficient support *outside* the ranks of the working people to overcome their isolation.

From the word “go” the success or failure of Popular Unity was clearly going to depend on whether it could win over, or at the very least neutralise, a significant proportion of the middle sections, so as to deprive reaction of their support. It was the Right that had to be isolated—not the working class and its vanguard. The question was posed by Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Chile, less than a year before the coup: “Our basic task consists in rallying the overwhelming majority of Chileans behind the Government and its revolutionary programme. This is quite feasible because the programme of the Popular Unity bloc accords not only with the interests of the working class but also with the aspirations of the middle social strata, with the country’s supreme interests. In other words, the matter concerns the need to isolate our main enemies, winning to our side those sections of the population that are still under their influence. What is needed is to do away with limitations in the pursuance of our policy in this sphere and to give a vigorous rebuff to the attacks of the ‘ultra left’ wing forces, which with their adventurist actions have been bringing grist to the mill of reaction.”

## ULTRA LEFT

The economic measures taken by the Government in an attempt to detach the middle strata from support for the right wing—tax concessions to small businessmen, guarantees to small and medium farmers that their land would not be taken over—were sabotaged by the economic crisis provoked by U.S. imperialism and local reaction. This was only to be expected. But the battle waged by Popular Unity for the middle sections was also undermined by numerous actions on the part of the ultra left: the forcible occupation of small farms—as distinct from the big estates scheduled for take-over—and the demands for the expropriation of small and medium-sized Chilean-owned factories. Such actions, the result of a mindless revolutionism incapable of distinguishing between the different phases of the revolution and the consequent need to win allies at each stage against the main enemy, had the effect of driving tens of thousands of middle class people—small businessmen, farmers, doctors and technicians—all potential supporters of Popular Unity, into the waiting arms of reaction.

The need to win over large sections of the middle strata is one of the key lessons of the Chilean experience, of particular application to the developed and developing countries, in few—if any—of which Socialism is likely to be achieved by an armed uprising of the vanguard, but by the building of a broad, powerful, anti-monopoly, anti-imperialist alliance.

Some elements on the left have concluded from the crushing of Popular Unity that, in the final analysis, it is armed force that determines victory or defeat for the revolution. Others do not go quite so far, but argue that what happened in Chile means that Socialists must plan for *both* eventualities—a peaceful or a bloody transformation of society.

Neither of these reasonings are very profound. To take the first one: you might just as well say that Socialism can never be brought about by armed insurrection because attempts to do so have proved bloody failures in a number of countries. Yet it is obvious that in certain countries, given the specific conditions, it is impossible to conceive of capitalism being overthrown *except* by violence.

As for preparing simultaneously for both forms of revolution, this is not serious politics, the approach of a responsible, Marxist party, which has to evaluate the concrete situation in society, assess the balance of class forces both internal and external, identify the main direction in which the country is developing, take note of certain historical, social and cultural factors—and then, in the light of the sum

of all these considerations, decide whether it is a violent or a peaceful way to Socialism that is indicated, and plan for it accordingly.

## VIOLENCE

Perhaps it would be better to speak of the "democratic" rather than the "peaceful" way to Socialism. Because no Communist Party is so naïve as to imagine that just because it intends to achieve Socialism by peaceful methods, avoiding civil war, by a combination of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary strength of the working class and its allies, that this means that the capitalist class, given half a chance, will not resort to violence, a violence that will have to be opposed with the violence of the people. Essentially, a belief in the "democratic road" means a confidence in the possibility of building such a powerful coalition of all the popular forces of the nation that the relatively tiny handful of exploiters will be in no position to resort to violence. Of course, violence on the part of the reactionary classes can never be *totally* ruled out, but the perspective of building the widest alliance of working class and democratic forces is aimed at developing the most favourable conditions in which to defeat it. The Chilean failure to achieve this must strengthen, not lessen, our own determination to do so.

## THE ARMY

But what about the Army?

The fact that it was the armed forces that were the instrument used to smash Popular Unity has led to a number of erroneous conclusions by some people on the left, who have not grasped the fact that the basic weakness of Popular Unity—a weakness that led inevitably to a position in which the army was enabled to take the action it did—was its minority position in parliament, where it was impotent to push through the necessary legislation to deal with the consequences of the measures taken by imperialism and its allies to sabotage the economy, including the use of assassination and terror. Parliament, for example, steadfastly refused to pass any legislation to deal with the colossal inflation deliberately created by the joint efforts of Chilean capitalists and U.S. imperialism, which particularly hit the middle classes—the very sections whose support Allende desperately needed to gain, and who, unlike the working class, could not be compensated for rising living costs with wage increases or bigger social welfare payments.

The role of the military in the downfall of Popular Unity is quoted by opponents of the "peaceful" or "democratic" road as proof of the unreality of such a perspective. As long as there is an army, they argue, it will be a ready-made, obliging instrument to be used by the bourgeoisie to crush the revolution.

Their error consists of seeing the armed forces of the capitalist state as a monolithic body, eternally dedicated to the preservation of bourgeois rule, incapable of being affected or influenced by the social struggles going on around it. How, one wonders, do they reconcile this view with the role of the armed forces in the overthrow of fascism in Portugal?

In fact, the question of the armed forces should be seen as inseparable from the problem of alliances, from the task of winning the middle sections if not into support of the working class, at least into positions of neutrality.

## KITSON & CO.

The part being played by the British Army in Northern Ireland, and the views being aired in Britain by such military men as Kitson, Sterling, Walker & Co., certainly indicate the reactionary class role which elements of the right have in mind for the armed forces. But it indicates no more than that. Whether they are successful or not depends not on their intentions, but on the strength of the popular struggle. It should be noted that even in the case of Chile, it was not possible for reaction to use the armed forces against Popular Unity at the outset. Before this could be done, a bloody purge of Government supporters among officers and men had to be carried out by right wing generals and admirals, which included the murder of General Schneider and the enforced resignation of General Prats, his successor as Commander-in-Chief. This purge of the armed forces is still continuing.

But above all, the Army could not move in Chile until the *political* conditions had matured, until the mass support for the Government had been sufficiently eroded.

This is not to say that there is not an urgent need, now, in all capitalist countries, to fight for the *democratisation* of the armed forces, to insist that all servicemen enjoy the same political rights as civilians—to take part in political activities, join political parties, etc. The democratisation of the forces is an essential part of the struggle for Socialism, particularly in developing countries, where it is vital for the revolutionary movement to split the monolith of the Army by winning over to its side the progressive elements among both officers and men. That this can be done successfully is shown by the

experience of such countries as Portugal and Peru, where, influenced by the world-wide upsurge of the struggle for Socialism and national liberation, the armed forces are being increasingly involved on the side of progress.

As Luis Corvalan wrote in 1970: "These days no social institution is indifferent to the social storms raging all over the world and the tragedy of the hundreds of millions of poverty-stricken people. The attitude of the armed forces of the Dominican Republic during the U.S. invasion (1965) and the progressive nature of the military government in Peru show that a dogmatic approach to the army is no longer valid."

## CONSENSUS

Had Popular Unity had time to win a consensus of support in the country, extending beyond the workers and poor peasants to embrace the middle class from which a majority of the army officers came, a basis would have been laid for a thorough democratisation of the armed forces—a process which Allende had begun within the limitations imposed by the political realities of his position. It is these limitations that are ignored by those who fault Popular Unity for not having "dealt with" the Army from the outset, and for failing to arm the workers on a mass scale. To have attempted to do so before the Government had widened the basis of its support among the population and further isolated the reactionary forces, would simply have provoked the military coup sooner and *guaranteed* its success. The fact that this is what eventually happened does not mean that a coup was always the *inevitable* outcome.

Popular Unity was under no illusions as to the dangers that awaited it along the Chilean road to Socialism. In 1971 Luis Corvalan wrote: "The imperialists and the national oligarchy are preparing for subversion, and if that does not work, for a *coup d'état*. Therefore we must do everything we can to straitjacket them before they can force armed struggle upon us." A year later Corvalan pointed out that Popular Unity's perspective "presupposes a class struggle and not class harmony, not amicable coexistence between the exploited and the exploiter, and not rejection of an armed struggle if required."

The point is that the objective possibility of straitjacketing the class enemy and making it impossible for him to resort to civil war did exist in Chile, and it was wholly correct to attempt, by winning over ever-wider sections of the people, to transform that possibility into reality.

## IRRESPONSIBILITY

In the battle for the Army that was waged between Popular Unity and the right wing, the ultra left was a godsend to reaction, with its irresponsible calls on troops to disobey orders, etc. Similarly in the key field of the economy, which was being systematically sabotaged from within and without the country, the same forces, misunderstanding the actual stage of the revolution, called for the complete overthrow of the old structures and ignored the vital battle for production. And at a time when as a result of the deteriorating economic situation the day-to-day difficulties of life were proving too much for the middle sections to bear, and were driving large numbers of them into open opposition, the "instant revolutionaries" accelerated this fatal process by their occupation of smallholdings and the taking over of non-monopoly, non-strategic businesses.

The basic sectarianism of the ultra-left in Chile stemmed from its inability to identify the main enemy at any given stage—thus it made no distinction between the different sections of the bourgeoisie, between on the one hand the monopoly capitalists and landlords, allied to imperialism, and on the other, the non-monopoly capitalists whose interests conflicted with those of the monopolies. This blurring of distinctions was typified by their treatment of the Christian Democrat Party as a reactionary monolith, ignoring the fact that it had strong roots not only among the bourgeoisie, but among the working class—25% of the votes in trade union elections had gone to Christian Democrats—and the intermediate sections of the population. Yet these were the people that *could* have been won to support Popular Unity.

## LESSONS

While there are important and tragic lessons to be learned from the sectarian attitudes of the ultra left, the latter only account in part for the defeat of the Allende Government. Some of the more basic factors have been mentioned already—the objective difficulties of the situation, in particular the vulnerability of an economy such as Chile's to imperialism, and the specific class structure of the country. We must add to these objective factors the subjective mistakes made by the Popular Unity Government.

Some of these have been touched on in an article in the July 1974 issue of "World Marxist Review" by leading Chilean Communist Rene Castillo.

(Continued on page 19)

# IRELAND'S NATURAL RESOURCES

**I** ATTEMPT to trace the history of the development of a national consciousness of the existence of natural resources of significance (over and above the traditional ones such as land), and the consequent development of a political will to achieve effective ownership and control.

This problem is not unique to Ireland. A meeting of the U.N. General Assembly took place at the end of April 1974 which approved a document relevant to this article, forming a world-political background to the policies which we are trying to develop.

Section 4 sets out, among others, the following principle, in sub-section (e):

Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, *including the right to nationalisation or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right.*

We consider first the question of land-based mineral resources, then we consider the question of hydrocarbons.

## LAND-BASED MINERAL RESOURCES

The mining boom of the 'sixties, which developed as a result of the opening up of the country to foreign capital in 1958, gave rise to a situation in which it was possible in 1970 for a group of students (Milo Rockett and the Resources Study Group) to produce a study entitled "Irish Mining: the need for Action".

This study exposed the consequences of the sell-out of the previous decade, in numerical terms. It was widely quoted on the financial pages, and gave rise to some television interviews. The mining companies were placed on the defensive and enough of content of the study became common knowledge for the politicians to be influenced.

A historical introduction showed how the 1940 legislation gave power to the Minister which he then proceeded not to use. Instead a deal with International Mogul was done in 1955 whereby the State exploration costs (some half a million) to date were recouped, giving Mogul the right to 91% of subsequent operating profits.

This deal set the norm for subsequent deals with Northgate and its subsidiaries, one of which is Tara Exploration & Development Co.

Detailed figures of profitability for the six mines named (Tynagh, Gortdrum, Silvermines, Avoca, Ballynoe and Bennetsbridge) were given. The total cost of bringing the six mines into production was estimated at £23m., while the profits over the life of the Silvermines and Tynagh were estimated at £60m. each. Thus the type of cash flow projection envisaged was well within that to which State industry (e.g., Aer Lingus or the E.S.B.) is accustomed, with the difference that the return on investment was very substantially greater.

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By Roy Johnston

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The following were among the demands listed at the end of the study:

- (a) All foreign interests in the Irish mining industry to be nationalised without compensation. . . .
- (b) A State mining company to be set up to prospect for, extract, smelt, and market the mineral wealth of this country.
- (d) . . . the technical personnel of these corporations should be given the opportunity to participate in a crash programme to train workers in these skills and in the setting up of a School of Mining in Ireland.

In the subsequent discussions it emerged that the first demand meant "compensate them for their expenditures to date, but do not compensate them for super-profits forgone".

The next milestone was the Galway conference on November 5-7, 1971, of the Irish Geological Association, which was sponsored by the U.C.G. Geology Department under Professor David Skevington.

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This had the title "the genesis of Base Metal Deposits in Ireland" and attracted some 300 delegates, despite the initial feeling that the meeting would only be of limited interest, confined to basic researchers. All the major exploration and mining companies were there in force. It was shown that there were processes at work which functioned according to a predictable pattern, to the extent that Ireland could be designated technically as a "mineral province".

A spokesman of the Resources Study Group requested permission to address the audience, and made a reasoned case. He was listened to politely, without however raising any discussion, as this would have been out of order.

However, I remember in the aftermath attempting to sample the opinion of the assembled economic geologists, geophysicists and others regarding their attitude to working for a national State enterprise rather than a multi-national corporation. On balance, a family man would prefer a long-term stable job, and so would plump for the State enterprise, while a young man wanting to see the world might for a period be attracted to a system which exploited quickly and moved on.

It further became apparent that there were many repatriate Irish working for multi-nationals whose loyalty would easily switch to a State enterprise if the openings existed; also that the non-Irish were quite at home here, had often married Irish girls and would be content to stay in whatever job would give them long-term security.

This confirms the Resources Study Group's opinion that expertise is not a problem.

Subsequently, on March 3, 1972, Murrough O'Brien, who is a director of Irish Base Metals, Tara, Avoca and the Smelter Corporation of Ireland, delivered the MacNeill lecture, an annual prestige event of the Trinity College Engineers. In this lecture he projected a decidedly national outlook on the use of base-metal development under national ownership and control as a means of upgrading economic life. He instanced Finland as a model. Yet by his association with Canadian financial interests, which are interested in maximum speedy return on investment, he has placed himself in an anti-national position.

It is possible to understand the evolution of a Murrough O'Brien from a position of frustration in the Geological Survey Office in the 'fifties, where he was Director, towards a technical involvement with Canadian interests, leading to his subsequent return to Ireland. This evolution was inevitable, once the State refused to take up the power available

from Lemass's 1940 Act. A progressive government could have acted, and could still act in such a way as to bring back the expertise lost through neglect, and use it to train a new generation.

On March 14th, 1972, Tara and Northgate issued through Michael O'Reilly Associates a response to the work of the Resources Study Group in which they attempted to refute the figures produced by the latter. This they do by the expedient of considering only the cash flow to date, which has been sufficient to pay out relatively small dividends to investors, rather than the total cash flow over the life of the operation, which was the basis of the Resources Study Group projections. The latter also were inclined to think in terms of value of metal, assuming the existence of a smelter and value added within the Irish economy, while the O'Reilly Associates publication sticks to unprocessed ore, exported raw, possibly at a price rigged so as to evade tax, as is the practice in the internal accounting of the multi-national corporations.

However, the total outgoings claimed, £45m. over more than a decade, is well within the compass of what a State enterprise might have done.

There is a concession made to this point of view: ". . . I do not believe that any Irish banking, financial or individual grouping would invest the £45 million already invested . . ." (Pat J. Hughes). Note that he does not exclude the State, which has the track record of Aer Lingus, Bord na Mona and the E.S.B. behind it. Is this a hint that Tara-Northgate, back in 1972, were prepared to bow to the inevitable and accept a nationalisation deal that would leave the Canadian financial interests in business with an average rate of return on their investments, while leaving the Irish people with the option of serving a State company?

## TARA

Early in 1971 the Resources Study Group came up with a further study, this time concentrating on the Navan ore-body.

The study, entitled "Navan and Irish Mining", has no publication date on it, and no address, which constitutes a headache for potential distributors and future historians. It is a pity that the accumulated experience of the organised political left was not made available to the Resources Study Group, and that the latter did not know to come and seek it. This is a reflection of the existence of a generation gap, constituting a real blockage to the passing on of hard-earned experience.

However, despite this, the Navan study emerges as a thundering rejoinder to the Michael O'Reilly Associates public relations exercise. Refuting point by point the arguments of the latter, the Resources Study Group comes up with an uncompromising gross refined metal value of the known mineral deposits of £1.77 billion, of which £1.05 billion is attributable to the Navan mine.

Given the present (i.e., 1973?) structure of the industry, only £371 million, or 20.9% of the metal value, would enter into the economic life of the country.

This constitutes only 2.5% of the wealth generating potential; this latter quantity they estimate by using Keynes' multiplier, and by estimating the snowballing effect of metal-using industries.

The study also points out the fact that the initial indications of ore at Navan were obtained in geochemical work carried out by the Agricultural Institute.

The alternatives are listed: royalties, taxation, development by Irish private enterprise, nationalisation "with" and "without" compensation.

The idea that native Irish capitalism has anything to offer is, correctly, dismissed (see the C.I.I. section, below). The various tax alternatives are spelled out, but their consequences are missed (see below). The nationalisation alternatives are defined as follows:

- (a) "with compensation" implying the State paying the company for the ore still in the ground
- (b) "without compensation" implying the State paying only for capital investments to date.

These formulations, I believe, are incorrect and misleading. "Nationalisation with compensation" of the assets of Tara is a moderate slogan which would leave us on the right side of international law, without threat of sanction. The *correct* content of the "with compensation" slogan is that the *State pays for capital investments to date*, in other words the content which the R.S.G. have labelled "without compensation"! Thus the idea was suggested that Tara *owns* the ore in the ground and therefore has to be "compensated" for giving it up.

Under Irish law, the *State* unquestionably owns the ore in the ground, so there is no need either to "nationalise" it or to "compensate" anybody for taking it away from them. This confusion, fortunately, is being cleared up gradually by the work of the Resources Protection Campaign.

I now come to the effect of changing the taxation rate. This can be understood by reference to a procedure outlined by Dr. Raymond Keary of the University College of Galway Geology Department, in an article in the *Irish Times* on Sept. 26th, 1973.

Referring to Latin American conditions, Dr. Keary states that ". . . Traditionally mining in these areas has been a wasteful 'cream skimming' process. Companies fearful of losing their concessions have maximised their profits by mining the highest grade ore only and leaving behind lower grade, but still economic, ore of a lower profit potential. This lower grade ore, once left behind, may become uneconomic to work because of increased future mining costs and a more complex operation necessitated by the presence of disused, backfilled and inevitably highly dangerous workings. In this way the life of a mine may be significantly shortened while the total value of the deposit is lowered in favour of higher short-term profits."

The effect of varying the tax is simply like varying the setting of a cream separator; if you have high tax, they skim richer cream, take maximal profits, depart sooner and leave more low-grade ore in the ground, dangerous to re-develop.

## THE U.S.I. PAMPHLET

In a pamphlet published on December 7th, 1973, the Union of Students in Ireland produced a case based broadly on the Resources Study Group work, but also with some work of their own.

The central argument of the U.S.I. pamphlet demolished the idea of a State minority participation, an option which was not considered in the Resources Study Group work. While the author(s) realised the importance of the State having a controlling interest, they base their arguments on the "iniquity of the foreign shareholders taking out all those profits", rather than on the much more crucial "creaming" procedure.

The point is that the State with a minority holding could not dictate the rate and extent of exploitation of the mine; i.e., they could not prevent a creaming procedure from being adopted in the most rapid possible manner.

The State with full ownership, or even majority equity participation, could run the mine slowly, for a long time, taking in the lowest possible grade ores at every stage, so as to break even after setting aside for local and national long-term development funds.

This would be the correct long-term national strategy. The longer we leave the ore in the ground, the more valuable it is.

The rate of exploitation of the State mines would be related to the capacity of the smelter, which would be on a modest but economic scale. We should not be interested in a huge installation, to exhaust our resources rapidly.



There is no over-riding economy of scale in mining. According to Murrough O'Brien, quoted in the R.S.G. "Navan" study, preface, "... the tabulated vital statistics for the life of the Abbeytown, Co. Sligo, lead-zinc mine are a model of what we would wish to see published . . . it is extremely relevant to be reminded by the Abbeytown figures that with good engineering a small mine on low-grade ore (250 tons/day with about 4% lead plus zinc) could survive economically for a decade . . .".

It is clear that we are under no obligation to dispose of Tara on a time-scale dictated by the mining giants.

The U.S.I. pamphlet contains a model set of proposals, which have in essence been adopted by the Labour movement (Dublin Trades Council and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions):

- (1) . . . the Government should retain its exclusive ownership of the mineral rights in Navan and not relinquish them to any private company.
- (2) . . . that the (Tara) lease should be granted exclusively to the State-owned Mianrai Teoranta, (which) should be recapitalised and reactivated by the State.
- (3) That a State-owned national smelter be established simultaneously with the development of Mianrai Teoranta's operations at Navan. . . .
- (4) That the surplus generated by the extractive and smelting operations be used to establish metallurgical industries in Ireland.
- (5) That the staff of the mining companies be given the option of transferring to Mianrai Teoranta under mutually agreed conditions of employment.
- (6) That the Government should establish a State mineral resources exploration company to work closely with the Geological Survey for the prospecting of new mineral deposits.
- (7) That the Government should transfer the Irish operations of all the mineral extraction companies currently in Ireland to Mianrai Teoranta.

The U.S.I. should perhaps have put in a proposal that there be developed training facilities for economic geologists, geophysicists and geochemists in the Universities and Colleges of Technology.

## ASSOCIATION OF ECONOMIC GEOLOGY

A small pamphlet, being a reprint of an *Irish Times* article, was published on August 19th, 1974, entitled "The Irish Mining Industry at the Crossroads".

This constituted an appeal by the qualified personnel working in the industry that the situation be clarified, so that exploration can continue, and their jobs made secure.

Couched in the language of the industry, it sought to undermine the demand for the smelter by suggesting that the present zinc shortage is due to environmental controls causing the closure of some older smelters, and that new and cleaner ones will shortly come on line; it does not, however, say why one of these should not be Irish.

Despite this, the pamphlet can be interpreted as an appeal from a group of people who are asking the State to guarantee their future employment in exploration, one way or another.

## THE CONFEDERATION OF IRISH INDUSTRY

In their Bulletin on October 1, 1974, the C.I.I. refer to the "mining industry crux".

After stating briefly the history of the matter, they come out with the following lines of action for the Government:

- (1) It must stimulate the rate of exploration by providing a favourable taxation and political climate.
- (2) It must have a role in agreeing the optimum rate of production of each operation. . . .
- (3) It must ensure a generous return on exploration and production investment. . . .
- (4) It must take action to stimulate the appropriate degree of downstream processing which is economically justifiable.
- (5) It must take action to ensure the removal of legal and political uncertainties.
- (6) It must make the best decisions in the national interest.

These proposals are vague and even contradictory. The "role in agreeing the optimum rate of production" could presumably be the "yes-man" role of a minority director. It says nothing about the control of the grade of the ore down to which exploitation takes place, yet this is central to the control of the creaming process. How proposals 2 and 3 are squared with proposal 6, bearing in mind Dr. Keary's remarks above, must remain one of the mysteries.

## FOSSIL FUELS

It has been argued, speciously, by oil interests, that to pipe the Kinsale gas exclusively to the E.S.B.

for a generator could be "inefficient". This has been used as an argument against those who would place the Kinsale gas find under national ownership.

I must refer to a paper read at a conference organised by the Institution of Engineers in Ireland on November 9, 1972, by J. P. Byrne, who is an engineer by training and is lecturing in the U.C.D. Commerce Faculty.

In this the author develops arguments for optimising the use of (a) electricity, (b) bottled gas, (c) town gas under a single national policy.

Because electricity generation capacity is highly absorbent of capital, and the use of electricity for heating is highly inefficient, production should be curtailed and growth in energy consumption for heating should be taken up by gas and other fuels. This could be done by appropriate pricing.

At the time, this article was listened to politely and forgotten. This was prior to the Kinsale gas find.

Now however that the Kinsale gas is there and available to the extent of a substantial proportion of the current E.S.B. fuel consumption, the Byrne article becomes highly relevant.

It would be of questionable value to pipe the gas ashore to one big E.S.B. generator. It would, on the other hand, be feasible to establish a gas grid, to supply gas for industrial and domestic use, and to supply a number of decentralised E.S.B. generators (of the gas-turbine variety), including some large generators near towns, linked with district heating systems for the waste heat.

The E.S.B. would have no need to "go nuclear" if it were absorbed into a National Energy Board which also controlled the Gas Grid.

The E.S.B., currently, is being forced to "go nuclear" because it is constrained by existing legislation to concern itself uniquely with the production and sale of electricity.

I also note an article by Owen Sweeney, of the Development Services Division of the I.T.G.W.U., in the *Irish Times* of September 27. This constituted a move on the part of the I.T.G.W.U. towards involvement in the energy debate, although initially at the level of an informed opinion by a staff member rather than as official policy.

This article constituted an informed attempt by a non-specialist researcher to come to grips with a complex situation. It noted the fact that we were re-importing technology which our graduates had helped to develop abroad. It did not present a hard set of proposals, although it held out for 50% State equity, a State oil authority, conditions

attached to licences requiring bases in Ireland, all oil to be landed, etc.

## THE RESOURCES PROTECTION CAMPAIGN

This group emerged on October 10th, 1973, united in its determination to build on the Resources Study Group and to develop a mass-based pressure group. It soon became evident that a movement with considerable dynamic and unifying potential had been launched, as large meetings were held in various centres throughout the country.

Novel modes of activity were developed (e.g., sample-survey procedures, the results of which were quoted with unease by the London *Financial Times*).

Pressure from the R.P.C. resulted in the production of the U.S.I. pamphlet referred to above, as a more digestible document than the original R.S.G. study.

The existence and activity of the R.P.C., especially in the Trade Unions, resulted in the U.S.I. programme being adopted in essence initially by the Dublin Trades Council, and subsequently by the I.C.T.U.

At the first annual general meeting of the R.P.C., which took place on October 13, 1974, it became clear that the attention was switching to offshore oil and gas, while however it was still considered necessary to keep up the pressure for a controlling State interest in Tara, making use of all opportunities presented by the I.C.T.U. policy. Dr. Kenneth Rosings, a Dutch-based expert, was produced, a colleague of Professor Peter Odell, of "Odell ratio" fame (there is a factor of four between the "proven reserves" used by the oil companies in negotiating and the "average yield" which subsequently emerges. This is a convenient piece of statistical mystification). This gave the occasion some standing, and RTE were present.

The stage is now set for a major non-party political popular movement to demand a revocation of the Marathon licence and the development of an independent State oil policy, drawing on Norwegian experience. The State position has been shifted to within reach of majority State participation. The same or greater change can be brought about in the case of oil and gas, if the people understand it, want it and unite.

In this situation, a document has emerged which apparently casts for itself in the oil and gas scene the role of the Resources Study Group material on Navan. This is "The Great Oil and Gas Robbery—

(Continued on page 20)

## End of Direct Rule

(Continued from page 6)

Assembly unless some life is breathed into its structure. In the "hot political climate" of Northern Ireland, a "talking shop" will result in a shooting shop. The Convention would not only have to discuss what structures may be necessary: it would also have to begin discussing questions of control of social, political, economic and cultural life of the area. Britain would have to make clear her intention to take effective steps to end the centuries-old "Irish" question and provide the setting in which the people can come together. The 1962 Programme of the Communist Party (N.I.), "Ireland's Path to Socialism," called for the establishing of Progressive Governments in both parts of Ireland. Such Governments, it was argued correctly, could provide a bridge for the eventual unity of the Irish people and establish the basis on which to go forward to a Socialist Ireland.

## POWERS

To do this, Britain must provide the necessary political setting, as expressed above, and then get down to drawing up, in all seriousness, the legislation which could provide for such a Government in Northern Ireland. Such a Government should have powers to deal with trade, industry, industrial legislation, fuel and power, transport, water, land, agriculture, fisheries and forestry, food, etc. Powers would be also necessary to deal with social services, radio and television, and to provide a control of fiscal powers . . . all at present still "excepted matters" under the Act of 1920—54 years later.

Such a programme would not please an *Imperial Administration* but it is more than time to end the scandal of Britain's colony in Western Europe, i.e., Northern Ireland. The interests of the foreign, British and other, multi-national corporations may look askance at such proposals but it would provide the people here with the democratic weapons to secure the industries that have been built up with their money, toil and sweat and ensure that the profits made remain in Northern Ireland to enhance and develop the economic structure. The ultra Unionists, whose only interests are to serve monopoly capitalism and reign on whatever dunghill of a political structure would be created in the latter's interests, would also not be pleased. But such a programme could end the support of their bigoted and sectarian policies on the part of the Protestant section of the working class and wrest them from their present colonial status. Such a programme

would enable a real Irish dimension to be realised and would expose the faint hearts in Belfast, Dublin and London. It would provide a platform on which all those sincerely interested in, and prepared to work for, the future of the Irish people could come together, without violence and in peace, to work out the future for Ireland and its people. We should not be afraid of the future; the working class of our country is strong and will be a hundred times stronger when it is united. The capitalist classes of Ireland and Britain fear that unity—as the devil fears Holy Water.

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## Roots of Coalitionism

(Continued from page 8)

An objective weakness in relation to the building of a mass progressive movement was the position of the small farmers. They were not a land-hungry mass movement. They had by and large got their land. It was a reform of the system (the abolition of annuities) not a revolution that they wanted. Both the Labour Party and the Left called for revolutionary demands like the breaking up of the big estates. Fianna Fáil took over the movement for the abolition of annuities and won their support.

"More suited for martyrdom than leadership" is Peadar O'Donnell's wry comment on the Left-wing leadership when he tells the story of that period in "There Will Be Another Day".

## DEVELOPMENT

From that period the roots of Coalitionism were laid in the Labour Party. Fianna Fáil, by a clear programme for the national development of the 26 counties, had won not only the support of the forces of discontent outside the working-class but the support of a substantial section of the workers as well. The Irish Labour Party, functioning from a very narrow base and with a "practical" outlook which confined it to that base was inevitably being driven towards a marriage with whoever would have it.

The Left functioned in a terribly difficult situation of religious hysteria and outbreaks of pogrom. At the same time it was inhibited from tackling and analysing the situation in terms of the real level of development of the economic and class forces by the dogmas of the period. The Left has learned and is learning from those mistakes.

For the fact is that in the '30s there was a mass radical movement in Ireland but it was not one

which fitted the model. It fell completely under the leadership of the native capitalists because the political genius of De Valera was able to recognise, organise and lead it.

## STEP BACK

With its slogan "The Seventies Will Be Socialist" the Irish Labour Party, instead of taking a step into the future took a step back to the days of the "Voice of Labour". Socialist slogans are not a policy. Of course it's impossible to repeat history and this particular farce was ended with great rapidity. This is not to say that those who pushed for Socialism in the Labour Party were insincere. It is merely that no matter how Left-wing they were they remained part of the same political stream which has kept Labour ineffective politically. Instant Socialism is just as inept a solution as reformism.

The Irish Labour Party is a Social Democratic Party of the type seen in imperialist countries functioning in a country which remains a semi-colony. To an extent this reflects the contradictions in the development of Ireland.

British imperialism, which from 1922 was supposed to be largely out of Irish affairs, now looms larger and larger on the political horizon. It won't go away by closing your eyes to it, any more than the Civil War did when Cathal O'Shannon dismissed it as a minor matter.

And now an aspect of Irish Labour, its continued links with British Labour, can be made to play an extremely important role in a progressive direction. With the loss of the Empire the British worker is now being brought face to face with his own imperialists on every level. The interests of the Irish and British workers are coming closer together. The radicalisation of the British workers can help radicalise the Irish workers, while the British worker can be brought to see that Irish independence is necessary for the freedom of both working-classes.

A new stage has been reached. The crisis of imperialism is undermining the very basis upon which reformism has arisen in the Labour movement.

The interests of the Irish and British workers are the same. The idea of "two nations" in Ireland with two Trade Union Congresses finds its echo in the call for "British unions to get out".

Pseudo-nationalism goes hand-in-hand with pseudo-radical Unionism. They must both be defeated.

## After Chile (Continued from page 12)

Among the factors he lists was the inability of Popular Unity to prevent reaction taking advantage of the democratic freedom it enjoyed in order to prepare the conditions for a fascist *coup d'état* and destroy democracy. The appeal to the people issued by the Communist Party shortly after the coup noted, in this connection: "the people will return to power but, of course, will be under no obligation to re-establish all the old institutions. The people will adopt a new constitution and new laws, will promulgate new decrees, establish new government departments and institutions as part of a law-governed state of a higher type than the one strangled by the putschists. And it will be a state in which freedom of thought will be respected along with all the humanist principles, but there will be no place for laws leaving loopholes for economic sabotage, subversion and fascism."

## ERRORS

Having listed a number of both left and right errors on the part of Popular Unity which contributed to its downfall, Castillo states: "We suffered both military and political defeat (military defeat was due mainly to our political defeat). We were defeated because the working class was isolated from its allies." He goes on: "The isolation of the working class from its allies enabled the reactionaries to launch their coup. Isolation ruled out the possibility of the working class and the people taking up arms."

This must be the principal lesson that the tragic defeat of the Allende Government holds for the Communist and Socialist Parties of the capitalist world—just as the victory of Popular Unity in 1970 showed how the working class can triumph when the majority of the people identify themselves with its aims and objectives. What the Chilean experience highlights for Socialists everywhere—whether they have chosen the armed way to Socialism, or the peaceful, democratic road—is the all-important question of alliances.

This is of particular relevance to countries like Ireland, where the working class is only a minority of the population. It will not be sufficient to achieve the political unity of the working class around a programme for Socialism, or to win a majority of a few seats in Dáil Eireann in order to ensure the transition to a Socialist Ireland. What is necessary is for the working class to build a system of alliances which at every stage of the struggle for a Socialist society will increasingly isolate the main enemy and deprive him of his allies among the non-proletarian

classes and sections of classes.

This means looking wider than the worker/small farmer alliance, towards *all* those sections of society whose interests are—and can be shown to be—in conflict with imperialism and monopoly capitalism, not merely social classes as such, but whole *categories* such as women, youth, cultural and scientific forces and the like. Such groups, irrespective of the social class to which they belong, can and must be won to the side of the working class, to accept the leading role of the working class in changing society.

To build such an alliance—which will be invincible—not only must we be able to identify correctly the exact stage of the struggle that has been reached, and put forward the programmes corresponding to it, but we must project an image of Socialism with which people can readily identify, seeing in it the guarantee of their own full, free and unfettered development as human beings.

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**Ireland's Natural Resources** (From page 17) a case study in *Monopoly Capital* published by Sinn Fein (Gardiner Place).

I can do no better than reproduce extracts from the review published in the November 1974 issue of the *Irish Socialist*.

### **OIL AND GAS ROBBERY**

... the book contains: (1) a brief history of the international oil cartels; (2) the origins of the present alliance between Irish capitalists and the international cartels, with the former playing a very junior role; (3) an estimate of output and profitability of the Kinsale gas strike; (4) an estimate of the overall reserves in Irish waters, and a comparison with the Middle East and elsewhere; (5) a detailed listing of the directors who are concerned in the deal, together with their other interests; (6) an evaluation of the diversionary role of the nuclear reactor; (7) an estimate of the petrochemical potential arising from an independent policy of hydrocarbon development; (8) an analysis of the methods whereby the oil monopolists manipulate governments, markets and prices.

... total Marathon expenditure on boreholes to date is about £14m. The value of this Kinsale gas, taking into account the Odell formula for the relationship between the "proven reserves" and the final output as derived from North Sea experience, is over £600m., of which over £300m. would be net of cost.

... The annual output of Kinsale could provide, in gas equivalent, nearly half of the total oil needs

in 1973; there is therefore no need to quibble about crudity of more general estimates. There is a good bird in the hand, as well as a flock in the bush. . . .

... The Irish oil capitalists have chosen to disperse their holdings, hanging in small groups on to the coat tails of various Big Brothers. . . .

Co-operative enterprise among the State bodies is already the norm (e.g., E.S.B.-Bord na Mona in production of electricity from turf), yet apparently such co-operation is being blocked in the field of oil and gas development. Instead, the E.S.B. is being shunted off on a nuclear by-pass, which will render Ireland again dependent on imported fuel, while our oil goes out under the control of monopolists to feed the oil-hungry imperialist economies.

### **HOW TO WIN A CAMPAIGN**

It is evident that there is considerable agreement within the Labour and Republican movements on the need to assert effectively the State ownership of mineral and hydrocarbon resources. This agreement is enshrined in the I.C.T.U. position.

There is potential for support for the I.C.T.U. position from every citizen whose house carries a mortgage, or who has a bank overdraft, or who buys food and counts the change; the high interest rate, the inflation rate and the cost of fertiliser are tied to the question of control of resources. A State, controlling its resources, could control its financial system and plan its economy.

Nothing must prevent the development of the Resources Protection Campaign into a massive movement of concerned citizens, which will force an independent policy on the politicians, despite any oil-company shares which may be held by the families of the latter.

The role of the Sinn Fein pamphlet must therefore be seen as an educator in the oil and gas question for those radicals who are already politically aware.

As the mass-educator of the general public, the uncommitted non-politicals who worry about the mortgage or the rent, we need pamphlet material which is along the lines of the U.S.I. "What's Mined is Ours" pamphlet, emanating from the R.P.C., researched and financed, hopefully, with Trade Union funds.

It is essential that the progressive political movements unite to see that organised labour remains in the lead of the Resources Campaign, and develops its political understanding in the process.

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