

BM

THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON MARKET



**WHY
IRELAND
SHOULD
NOT
JOIN**

TWO SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE

ASSESSMENT 2

THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON MARKET

This statement on the implications of Irish membership of the European Economic Community was drafted by the Economic Sub-committee of the Wolfe Tone Society and adopted at a meeting of the Society in March 1967. It has been revised to take account of developments up to May, 1967.

**THE SECOND
IN A SERIES OF
ASSESSMENT PAMPHLETS**

**Published by Republican Publications at 30 Gardiner Place,
Dublin, 1.**

INTRODUCTION

Only time will tell whether President De Gaulle's hostile reception to Britain's application to join the EEC represents a fixed determination to keep Britain out or signifies the adoption of a strong initial negotiating position by a French Government which is reconciled to ultimate British entry. In either case it remains true that British big business and the British Government see in Common Market membership the only solution acceptable to them for their present acute problems; they will therefore continue to desire entry to the Common Market for the foreseeable future, though having to contend with rising popular opposition to this policy from within Britain itself.

The French President's attitude should lengthen, however, the period before a British application for membership can possibly succeed. It therefore gives a little more time for public opinion in Ireland to become aware of the perils to this country of Common Market membership and of the alternative courses possible. It also gives time for the Dublin Government, if it is willing to use the opportunity, to look again at the consequences of the path it is seeking to commit the nation to, to adopt a more independent political and economic policy vis-a-vis Great Britain, and specifically to demand the revision of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in the light of Britain's decision to seek to join the EEC; as the effects of this Agreement are already causing serious unemployment and grave difficulties in certain areas of industry, a situation which can be expected to get progressively worse unless this Agreement is revised.

The main theme of this statement remains valid irrespective of whether the prospects of British Common Market membership come closer or recede. It is that while the Common Market may be of benefit to various interests on the continent or even in Britain, it nevertheless is not in Ireland's political, economic or cultural interests to join. Even if Britain is excluded from the EEC, and America comes to her rescue by seriously launching the proposal for an Atlantic Free Trade Area referred to in the text, or some other arrangement, the necessity will still remain for an Irish Government to drastically modify its political and economic policies if genuine independence and full employment are to be achieved for the country.

LACK OF PUBLIC AWARENESS

THERE is widespread lack of awareness in Ireland of the consequences for the Irish nation of membership of the European Economic Community. This is particularly true of the Labour Movement, where people widely entertain illusions about the character of the Common Market.

It is the policy of the Dublin Government to seek EEC membership in the event of Britain joining. If this comes about it would undoubtedly be the most serious and far-reaching step for the country since 1921. For the Treaty of Rome, which would have to be signed by Ireland if we join the EEC, contains no provisions whereby members may withdraw from membership later. In theory Ireland would be bound for ever to the EEC once we had initially joined. The decision, therefore, is not one that only concerns this generation of Irish people, but future generations as well.

This statement is issued to seek to awaken Irish public opinion, and especially opinion in the Labour movement, to the dangers to Irish nationality and independence which we believe EEC membership entails. It examines the structure of the EEC and the main political and economic consequences for Ireland of EEC membership, and suggests an alternative course for the country. It does so in the belief that the question of EEC membership raises issues of such profound importance for our country that Irish people of all political views should seek to examine them in a dispassionate light and to set aside in doing so the attitudes and beliefs that are based on party or sectional interest.

Most of the discussion on the Common Market in Ireland has to date been on the level of wish-fulfilment rather than of reality. Many commentators and spokesmen, either ignorant or wilfully utopian, confuse dreams with facts and argue as if the future were already here and known. Others are fully aware that we are being asked to gamble our political and economic future in the hope of obtaining extremely hypothetical gains. Characteristic of writing on the Common Market in Ireland has been the frequency with which "is" and "will" give way to "should be," "can be expected to," "I am confident that," and so forth. Statements of fact merge almost unnoticed into expressions of hope. There are constant transitions from real life to dream life in Common Market literature. Either ignorant of the Treaty of Rome, or unwilling to believe that it really means what it says, many Irish writers on the Common Market have failed to be fully honest in explaining to the Irish people what the Common Market is and what membership of it entails.

A UNION FOR ECONOMIC MONOPOLY

THE Common Market is an economic union between the six countries of the EEC (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg). It establishes a customs union between these countries by the abolition of duties, tariffs and any other restriction on the movement of goods between them and by the setting up of a common tariff against goods from outside the Common Market (the common external tariff). This customs union will be almost fully in force in 1968. The economic aim of the EEC is to bring about a free and unimpeded movement of goods, capital and workers throughout the area of the Community. The customs union is the first step in procuring this; but this aim also entails the harmonisation of economic and social policy by member states in such areas as taxation, quality control of goods, social security, planning policy, transport policy, state grants, the balance of public and private industry; as differences in these areas could distort free competition between the members. These aims in turn cannot be achieved without substantial surrender of sovereignty by individual states over their own affairs to the organs of the EEC. Consequently economic integration must lead in time to close political integration.

The Common Market was established in the interests and to serve the needs of the large monopolies and giant enterprises that dominate the economies of the main capitalist or "free enterprise" countries of Western Europe. These firms, which are in a monopoly or semi-monopoly position on their home markets, find these national markets too small a base for expansion and for benefiting from the economies of scale made possible by the character of their developed technology. They fear that if they are confined to national markets they will be taken over or surpassed technologically by the monopolies of the United States of America. They thus seek a continental-size market for themselves and they think that by combining on a European-wide scale they can stand up to the American giants. Moreover, by basing themselves on several countries instead of on one, and by their influence on the EEC Commission and the other EEC administrative bodies, the monopolies of France, Germany, Italy etc., see a way of escaping from the possibility of control over their activities, even possibly nationalisation, which could occur as a result of state planning on a national level. On a national level these huge companies and the powerful interests bound up with them are subject to some democratic control. They are not in the EEC as a whole, as we shall see when we examine the institutions of the Community. These are the economic interests behind the movement for a "united Europe."

It is important to realise that it is only a small minority of firms find themselves unable to reach technologically

optimum size on the basis of their national markets. The main ones are firms concerned with electronics, aircraft production, computers, motor-vehicles, nuclear energy, aerospace research, petro-chemicals. It is the monopolies and semi-monopolies in these areas that are the most ardent advocates of economic integration on a continental scale. They have nothing to lose because they are already in a monopoly position on their home markets. But the multitude of medium-sized and smaller firms in other industries are in a quite different position. Most of these are well able to reach technologically optimum size on their national markets. International competition would put many of them out of business and accelerate the trend towards centralization and monopoly for them. These firms are liable to be for or against economic integration in relation to how big or how small they are on their internal national markets.

However, the interests of giant firms anxious to establish themselves as national or continental-wide monopolies, and to secure huge monopoly profits in so doing, need in no way coincide with the interests of their employees or of the consumers of their products, whose interest it is to bring such agglomerations of economic, financial and political power under some form of democratic control. If the monopolies want to extend their economic sway over nations and would like to have national boundaries done away with, the peoples of those nations have an interest in establishing national control over the monopolies, of democratising their economies, in other words, and of resisting the sacrifice of their national interests on the altar of international capital.

POLITICAL TENSIONS

THE Common Market today is riven with political tensions. Our Irish civil servants who are the main architects of the Governments' Common Market policy, and who see themselves at home in the bureaucratic apparatus of the Brussels Commission, are rash indeed if they think the Common Market will remain the stable structure that it at present appears to them. Increasingly conflicts of interest between the national monopolies of the Common Market countries, Britain and America, reflect themselves in political conflict between the governments of these countries. The Community into which the Dublin Government wishes to lead the Irish people is a highly unstable one where there is no guarantee whatever—and no guarantee possible—that Ireland's national interests will have priority over the interests of the large powers that dominate it and whose policies, whether of conflict or cooperation, determine its destiny.

To list some of these political conflicts as they exist in early 1967, a time when the economic "miracle" of the

Common Market is over, with the economies of the European countries seriously sagging, with large-scale unemployment in Germany, and with Britain in crisis and desperately trying to enter the Common Market as a way out for the large monopolies of Britain at the expense of the British people:—

At present France politically dominates the EEC. The French monopolies are trying to keep American capital out of France to prevent themselves being taken over. De Gaulle sees the Common Market as a means by which European technology can be shared and French industry can remain independent of American control. He favours ties with the Communist countries as a means of escaping from the Cold War and American domination of the other capitalist countries which the Cold War facilitated. He seeks a detente with Russia as a means of containing an increasingly nationalistic West Germany, and he sees the Common Market as a major obstacle to the reunification of the two Germanies on the basis of permanent neutrality, the only basis on which this is possible, so as to ensure stability and peace in Europe. France fears British membership of the EEC, as this would break France's dominance and possibly replace it by a German one. Both Germany and Britain lean to America. America wants Britain in the Common Market as a counter-poise to De Gaulle and to enable America to economically dominate the countries of the Commonwealth, which Britain would have to finally abandon if she enters the Common Market. Germany is less interested than France or Britain in the Common Market as an economic arrangement, because her industry is the most powerful in Europe anyway. She sees in the EEC a possibility of some military agreement which would enable her get a hand on the "nuclear trigger," which to date she hasn't been able to obtain from the Americans. She thinks Britain's entry might facilitate this, as Britain is a nuclear power. At the same time the EEC gives German capital an opportunity of moving in on the former French colonies, almost half of Africa, which are associated with the Common Market. Italy, Holland and Belgium in turn want Britain in as a counterpoise to the power of Germany and France.

It is at this time, when the conflicts between the countries of the EEC are becoming more and more acute, that the British Government comes to give it a new lease of life by indicating she will renew her application for admission. Britain is sounding out the possibility of joining the EEC because the large British monopolies and the Government that serves their interests see no alternative way of solving their present acute problems. Britain's largest firms hope that European competition will help to keep down wages in Britain. The British Government has to carry out the behest of the New York and Basel bankers who have lent Britain over £1,000 million to strengthen the reserves of the pound. The American Government wants Britain in the Common Market for the

reasons mentioned above and to help preserve American influence in Europe. Indeed, if Britain fails to get admission to the EEC from France, many prominent Americans see in some form of Atlantic Union, between the USA, Canada, Britain, the Commonwealth and the EFTA countries a possible alternative bloc which would act as a counter to the EEC and be under America's dominance, with Britain retaining her semi-satellite status. In the event of the Wilson bid to enter the Common Market failing, this project may come much more to the fore and would have other dangerous implications for Ireland.

THE EEC and THE POOR COUNTRIES

THE proponents of the Common Market are in favour of free trade in industrial goods, in which they have an advantage because of their industrialised economies; but they want to preserve a highly protected agricultural sector at the expense of countries, such as Ireland, which rely a lot on the export of agricultural goods and raw materials to earn foreign exchange. Far from being an "outward-looking, open, easily accessible," market, as some EEC propaganda would have us believe, the Common Market in fact has been styled by an Australian Minister of Trade as "the most gigantic obstacle to international trading in world history." It is not surprising that the countries outside Western Europe, the poorer countries in which the vast bulk of humanity lives today, look upon the Common Market as a neo-colonialist device designed to help perpetuate the backward, non-industrialised character of their economies by closing the European market to their vital agricultural exports.

The building up of national industries is a cardinal task confronting the less developed countries, among which Ireland can legitimately be numbered. But European "integration" is creating very unfavourable conditions for the industrialisation of these countries. The EEC greatly narrows down the marketing possibilities for the traditional export branches of the agricultural exporting countries. The result is an erosion of the foreign-exchange and financial basis of their industrial plans. Moreover, the creation of the Common Market has meant that a united front of the West European monopolies has been established which will be able to exert a very powerful influence on the terms for the delivery of equipment and manufactures to the less developed countries. Little wonder that the Indian magazine, "New Commonwealth," reporting the wary attitude of India to the Common Market, stressed that India's "representatives tend to regret the possibility of the many markets of Europe coalescing into one as a potential menace to any hopes of playing one off against the other when buying machinery." Also, the establishment of the EEC has substantially al-

tered the conditions for exporting manufactures from the developing countries, including Ireland. Whereas formerly manufactures could compete in West European markets on more or less equal terms with the goods of other states, now they are discriminated against and they have to scale the high customs barrier which does not exist for manufactures in the other EEC countries.

Common Market policy is designed to strengthen the primary producing character of the economies of the poorer agricultural countries and thus to perpetuate their unequal status in the world economy. The EEC's external tariff against the rest of the world is designed to charge the poorer, agricultural countries for the privilege of selling their goods at knockdown prices to the rich, industrial ones, an arrangement which helps to intensify what is probably the most iniquitous economic feature of the modern world, the fact that primary products have to be sold at absurdly low prices, while those who sell them must buy industrial goods at monopoly-maintained artificial prices.

The gulf in living standards between the rich and the poor countries, and its political and economic consequences, will be a dominant element in the developing history of mankind during the remainder of the century. Ireland's long-term interests should align us with the "Third World" of newly independent states, seeking to industrialise their economies, rather than with the inward-looking, protected, monopoly-dominated group of rich industrial countries which holds sway in the Common Market and the Anglo-American world.

PLANNING A FREE-FOR-ALL

THE exponents of the Common Market believe that the road from the twentieth century to the twenty first goes by way of the nineteenth, or perhaps, more accurately, by the eighteenth. In other words, the major immediate purpose of the EEC is the creation and maintenance of as complete a system of laissez-faire (in plain English a free-for-all) in economic life as its founders are able to obtain.

"Planning" in the EEC is to facilitate competition. It is planning in order to prevent planning. It is trying to use modern knowledge and techniques in order to adapt the world to the economic superstitions of the eighteenth century, before it was realised that free competition led, not to efficiency, but to monopoly in whole areas of industry and economic life. In practice it is just as absurd as it sounds in theory, since it combines the necessary bureaucratic elements of planning with the inefficiency and purposelessness of laissez-faire. Democrats would plan because they know from experience that, if competition sometimes stimulates effort and ingenuity, it also leads to get-rich-quick methods of shoddy production, knows no social priorities, and is always wasteful. The bureaucratic planners of the EEC plan in order to ensure the "freedom" of every individual, outside specified

areas of exception, to exploit other individuals to the top of his bent.

In the words of Mr. Harold Wilson (Hansard, June 7th, 1962): "The plain fact is that the whole conception of the Treaty of Rome is anti-planning . . . What planning is contemplated is supra-national, not national, but it is planning for the one purpose of enhancing free competition . . . The Lord Privy Seal says there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome to prevent public ownership as such. I agree. But one cannot then use the public sector for planning purposes, for the establishment or enforcement of priorities, for anything which involves discrimination. One can have the form but not the substance of purposive public ownership".

There are small exceptions to the rule of laissez-faire in the EEC. There are expressions of belief in the Rome Treaty in cooperation on exchange rates, trade cycle and balance-of-payments policy, but there is no adequate machinery for ensuring that cooperation, and no provision for the enforcement of what may be agreed upon. These articles of the Treaty, therefore, are likely to remain mere words. Laissez-faire is also interfered with in relation to agriculture, agricultural prices being "managed." There is the Social Fund which is supposed to contribute half of the cost of retraining displaced workers, but which disburses only ludicrously small sums (£2½ million for the whole Community in 1965!); and there is the European Development Bank contributing, where appropriate, half the cost of development projects in underdeveloped areas of the Community. But the Development Bank makes its grants dependent on payment of interest at a level which must necessarily be high if its rules are obeyed, and on the creation of a sinking fund. Any other variation from strict laissez-faire requires the permission of the EEC Commission. Laissez-faire, then, is the rule, and bits of planning very much the exception.

There are pious aspirations in the Rome Treaty about the desirability of economic expansion and a more rapidly rising standard of living (Article 2) and about the improvement of working and living conditions (Article 117). But there is not a single reference to full employment in the Treaty. Laissez-faire and complete freedom of competition are trusted to do the job, and the clauses of the Treaty referring to economic expansion and rising living standards impose no obligations, precise or imprecise, on the EEC institutions or the constituent governments.

Freedom of competition has not prevented big business and monopoly planning arrangements coming into being throughout the continent on an extensive scale over the past ten years; it has rather facilitated these. Cartels and unpublicised agreements between big firms are now widespread in the EEC. The EEC Commission has made no significant impact on them, nor could it be expected to, even though they are supposed to be against the Treaty.

Governments which sign the Treaty of Rome sign away a great part of their planning and controlling powers. They bind themselves not to exercise any power

which would have the effect of a tariff, or an import quota, and which would affect trade between member states or have the effect of preventing, limiting or interfering with the free working of competition within the Community. This applies to state as well as private industry.

Other planning powers are handed over by Governments to the EEC Commission, which is committed to using them, not for any social purpose, but solely in order to enforce rules of free competition against the small firms which are the only ones against which the Commission is likely to be strong enough to enforce them; the large monopolies and cartels retain their monopoly position.

The Rome Treaty binds member States to regard the maximization of free competition as the overriding good, more important than full employment or any other social or aesthetic consideration — but it then fails to create any central authority with democratic backing and real power to deal with international monopolies and cartels. That is why, from the beginning, the money for propaganda in favour of European integration has come from the great European cartels and why, also from the beginning, the pro-Common Market campaign in Britain and Ireland has been led by the largest firms which are in a very strong position on their national markets.

The Treaty does have a section on social policy, but the section begins by affirming that free competition within the Community will itself promote any desirable social policies. Among the immense powers given to the organs of the Community there is not one, apart from the oft-mentioned three exceptions alluded to above, which will enable it to enforce or pursue or encourage any social policy. The Treaty also provides for the establishment of an Economic and Social Committee, on which there are representatives of employers and trade union bodies from the member countries. But the Committee's functions are purely advisory and it has no effective power whatever.

THE EEC COUNCIL

THE main organs of the EEC, established by the Rome Treaty, are the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. The Council consists of one government minister from each member state. It is roughly similar to the council of ministers or cabinet within national states. For the purpose of voting France, Germany and Italy have four votes each on the Council, Belgium and Holland two each and Luxembourg one. The Council decides a few minor matters by simple majority vote, a few matters have to be unanimous — so that any country has the right of veto — and a large number of matters have to be decided by weighted majority, that is, by 12 votes out of the 17.

If Britain enters the Common Market and is followed

by Ireland, Denmark and Norway — making a community of ten members — the weighted voting procedures would have to be rearranged. A likely arrangement might be the Six as before, with Britain four votes, Denmark and Norway two each and Ireland one, or at the most two. This would give Ireland a vote of one or two out of a total of twenty six or seven, and a weighted majority might need 17 or so votes. It is not likely that Ireland's one or two votes would enable her to carry much weight on such a body. Nor are there many matters in which Ireland has a common interest with the other smaller members which would enable her in combination with them to exercise much weight in policy-making on the Council.

There are now few areas left where individual member states on the Council have a veto. It is no longer possible for member states to delay the transition to free trade in industrial and agricultural goods in this way, as it was possible to do in the earlier stages of the Common Market. The most important areas still subject to unanimous decision of the member states are matters relating to co-ordination of taxation systems and harmonization of law and the admission of new members, as well as measures aligning social security policy in the Community.

The EEC Council is not a democratic body. It is responsible to nobody as a group, though its members are appointed and liable to change by the constituent governments of the EEC. Individual members of the Council cannot be held responsible to their national Parliaments for what they have done in a body whose proceedings are of necessity secret. Suppose Ireland joined the EEC and had a representative on the Council. It would be pointless and unjust to dismiss such a Minister who had tried and failed to prevent a decision which was unacceptable to the Irish Dail. If the Irish representative were known to have voted for it he could be compelled to resign. But the decision would still remain a valid one and be enforceable by the Courts of the country which had expressed its disapproval. There is thus no effective responsibility of Council Ministers to their home Parliaments.

THE Parliament or Assembly consists of 36 representatives each of the three bigger powers, 14 each from the two medium ones and 6 from Luxembourg. The members are delegated by national Parliaments, but do not have to correspond with the party structure in the national Parliament. If Ireland were in the EEC it would be possible for the majority party in the Dail to nominate only members of that party to represent Ireland in the EEC Parliament.

The Parliament meets once a year as of right and its only power is the passing by a two thirds majority of a vote of censure on the Commission, which entails the wholesale resignation of the Commission members. This, of course, does not amount to anything resembling parliamentary control of decision-making in any ordinarily accepted sense of that term. The EEC Parliament has

been given a steam hammer (the two thirds majority) which it can use, if it wishes, to crack nuts! It is a caricature of democracy.

There is provision in the Treaty of Rome for increasing the powers of the Parliament and for introducing a system of direct election by citizens of the member states; but these are subject to the veto of member governments. Various schemes and proposals have been put forward, but nothing has come of them. To all intents and purposes the European Parliament is window-dressing for the activities of the Council and the Commission and is a Parliament in no ordinary understood sense of that term.

THE EEC COMMISSION . . . BUREAUCRACY ENTHRONED

THE EEC Commission is the most powerful of the Community's organs, and its effective power has increased as the veto-power of member states on the Council has diminished. On nearly every matter the Commission is the only body in the Community with the right of initiative. The Council cannot consider its own proposals. It can consider only those of the Commission. This means that the Commission can prevent the Council from considering anything it does not want to be considered.

The Commission is the executive and civil service of the Community. It is, in the literal sense of the term, a bureaucracy, that is, a body of officials with the right and the duty to exercise many of the powers of government. The Commission consists of nine permanent officials appointed by the member governments for a minimum term of four years. Not more than two may come from any one country. The Commission decides matters by simple majority vote. Its purpose is to further the general aims of the Rome Treaty, to apply the laissez-faire and other rules, which the Commission works out and the Council approves, and to make proposals to the Council.

Such proposals as the Commission submits can normally be amended by the Council only if it is unanimous or by a weighted majority which includes at least four members. The Commission also prepares the Budget, administers the Social Fund, and takes member governments before the Community Court — a group of judges which interprets the terms of the Rome Treaty — as and when it thinks fit. The Commission is itself the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Court of the Community, and has been almost totally ineffective in controlling monopoly, as mentioned above. It runs the managed agricultural market, having in particular the vital function of fixing the variable levies on agricultural imports for this purpose.

The Commission has, as the Treaty says (Article 155) "its own powers of decision". Note the words "of decision". It can give orders to any member state on

the principles and details of application of the rules of free competition to nationalised industries or to any industries enjoying special or exclusive rights, or to monopoly services (e.g. C.I.E.). It can order a government which has taken emergency measures in defence of its currency to withdraw those measures (Article 73), and it can order it to abolish any form of State aid which it regards as incompatible with Article 92, defining in vague terms the permissible forms of State aid. In all these cases, the rule means that the bureaucrats have the last word, unless the government concerned takes the matter to the Community Court, the group of judges who interpret the Treaty and whose decisions are binding on the government concerned.

The Commission can also issue directives and authorisations on a wide variety of matters under the Treaty, mainly concerning tariffs, quotas, revenue duties, capital movement, the running of nationalised industries and the granting of government aid to industry.

What makes the nine bureaucrats the real rulers of the Community is not only the range and importance of the powers given to the Commission by the Treaty, but the conditions of its work and the manner in which they compare with the only other decision-taking body, the Council. The Commission decides by simple majority, and can therefore always reach some kind of decision. The Council requires either a unanimous vote or a weighted majority for any important decision, and may therefore find itself unable to reach a decision at all. The Commission has almost all the rights of initiative, and the Council can only either amend its proposals (by unanimous vote) or tell the Commission to think again. The latter right is, in practice, the one most frequently used and the only effective one. Moreover, the Commission members sit for a minimum of four years, while Council members come and go as governments change or are re-shuffled. The Commission meets as often as it likes, the Council only once a month. The Commission thus acquires a corporate personality and a mind of its own, while the Council can have none. The Commission also controls the Community civil service, prepares the Budget and runs the Social Fund.

There is no body of officials in any democratic country which enjoys anything even remotely resembling such a position of power vis-a-vis a body of Ministers issuing from a democratically elected Parliament.

To visualise anything equivalent at home, one would have to imagine Ireland having two Councils of Ministers, each with powers of its own, of which the second consisted entirely of permanent officials. None of these permanent officials would be responsible to any individual Minister in the first Council; on the contrary they would do many things without reference to the Ministers of the first Council at all. It would be the officials who were Ministers on the second Council who would appoint all other officials and it would be they

who would decide on the agenda of the first Council. The second Council could not be got rid of so long as it had the support of only one-third of the members of the Dail, and neither Council would be subject to any form of parliamentary control whatsoever.

A straightforward proposal to abolish our present Council of Ministers (Government) and replace them by the above arrangement would be treated with contempt. But the proposal to take Ireland into the EEC is in fact to take a great and growing part of our affairs out of the control of our present government and parliament and put them precisely under this kind of rule.

SOVEREIGNTY: THE EEC AND THE IRISH CONSTITUTION

TO sign the Treaty of Rome and join the EEC is to commit Ireland to the above political arrangements. It would mean the relinquishing of national control over substantial sectors of our political and economic life. Our ministers would no longer be free agents, but effectively subordinate to superiors in Brussels. If Irish Governments were criticised at home for the policies they carried out, they could shelter behind the Community, saying they were only carrying out its directives — which would be the truth. For the Council and Commission of the EEC would effectively be taking vital decisions affecting the lives and interests of Irish people, and these are undemocratic bodies subject to no popular control whatsoever, and certainly no popular control from Ireland.

Article 1 of the 1937 Constitution reads as follows: "The Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible and sovereign right to choose its own form of Government, to determine its relations with other nations, and to develop its life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance with its own genius and traditions".

Article 5 reads: "Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic State".

Article 28 reads: "War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war, save with the assent of Dail Eireann".

As is described above, the Rome Treaty brings into being bodies, such as the EEC Council, Commission and Court, which have powers to legislate for States that have hitherto been sovereign. Under Article 187 and 192 of the Treaty decisions of these EEC bodies may be directly enforced in the territory of the member states by the judicial machinery of those states. The validity of any Irish statute would depend not on whether it was in conformity with the Irish Constitution, but whether it conformed to the Rome Treaty as interpreted by the European Court.

In the view of Mr. C. Gavan Duffy, writing on the Irish Constitution and the Treaty of Rome in 1963, this would require at least one "absolutely essential"

constitutional amendment — namely the insertion of a clause to the effect that "nothing in the Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate any provision of the Treaty of Rome or to nullify any act done or purporting to be done under the Treaty of Rome". Such an amendment, as any other amendment, would, of course, require a referendum before it could be inserted.

Several other amendments might also be necessary. For example, Article 15, which states that the sole and exclusive power of making laws is vested in the Oireachtas, or Article 34, which states that "The decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive"; for if Ireland joined the EEC a clause might need to be inserted in the Constitution requiring the Supreme Court and the other Courts in their decisions to give effect to the rulings and binding opinions of the Court of Justice attached to the European Community.

Some Common Market propagandists will point out that every country must surrender part of its sovereignty in the modern world and that absolute sovereignty does not and cannot exist. This is, of course, true, but it confuses the distinction between political and legal sovereignty. When Ireland joins the United Nations or the World Health Organisation or any other international body, and when Ireland signs treaties with other countries, it voluntarily assumes certain obligations, thereby limiting its political sovereignty. But Ireland and the Dublin Dail acting under the Constitution retains its legal sovereignty. That is, the Dail can freely step back at any later stage and can reclaim the surrendered sovereignty if circumstances change by withdrawing from these organisations or abrogating the treaty in question. It can do this because the Dail retains this power and remains fully legally sovereign under the Constitution. Thus when Ireland signs treaties, what happens is that the Dail surrenders, over a clearly defined area, a part of the country's political sovereignty; but it surrenders none of its own sovereignty. It can reassert its sovereignty if it wishes by repealing the treaty in question.

THE Rome Treaty, however, is unique in that it restricts not only the political sovereignty of member States but also their legal sovereignty. In Ireland the Dail has the right under the Constitution to say what shall be law for the State. There can be no other law superior to the Constitution and to the laws of the Dail under the Constitution. The Irish people struggled for generations to obtain this right to determine themselves what laws should rule them. By signing the Rome Treaty an Irish Government would be surrendering that right over substantial and vital areas of our national life; for the Rome Treaty differs from other treaties, and is in fact unique, in that it has the character of a new Constitution, and its clauses the character of constitutional law for the States subscribing to it. In effect then, an Irish Government that

proposes to sign this Treaty is proposing that the Irish people — in return for slight and debatable economic advantages — should abrogate their claim to rule themselves. This is not only extraordinary political folly, but is a betrayal of the political aspirations of those who struggled to found an independent Irish State.

NEUTRALITY

There are other political implications of joining the EEC. One is the abandonment of the Irish Government's policy of military neutrality and keeping out of international military alliances. The last and present Taoiseachs have repeatedly stressed in their statements on the EEC that they accept the "full political implications" of EEC membership. This undoubtedly has been taken to mean the Irish Government's willingness to abandon the claim to legal sovereignty and to join a military alliance if that is required by the other EEC members. In February, 1967, a member of the EEC Commission, speaking in Dublin, referred pointedly to the fact that all the present EEC members were in a military alliance and that the possible prospective members, Britain, Norway and Denmark, were also in NATO. This was hint enough of what "full acceptance of the political implications of the EEC" might lead to. Membership of a military alliance may very likely require conscription. Those who lightly speak of our abandoning our military neutrality should consider more the implications of this.

Also members of the EEC must recognise one another's territorial frontiers. If Ireland joined the Common Market with Britain we would have thus to recognise the territorial frontiers of the United Kingdom. Yet the Constitution lays claim to part of the territorial area of the UK. Is the Dublin Government willing to abandon also its claim for a politically united Ireland? What of the effects of Irish EEC membership on the Border? It is true that if Ireland and Britain join, then customs posts would disappear between North and South; but the partition of Ireland is more than a question of customs posts; there were no customs posts within Ireland during the nineteenth century, when the whole island was part of the U.K.: If Ireland and Britain join the EEC the Six Counties will still remain politically part of the United Kingdom and laws for the area will be made in Brussels, Westminster and Stormont, not in Dublin. The close integration of the North and South with the British economy which would follow entry to the Common Market would possibly lead to a reduction in the importance of the political barriers in time; but it would be a "withering away" of barriers in the context of an Anglo-Irish economic, and possibly political, union similar to that of the nineteenth century, rather than an independent 32-County Ireland. One "solution" to partition that has always been acceptable to the British Government, as well as to Ulster Unionism, has been the effective return of the whole island to union with the United

Kingdom. The "solution" to the Border problem constituted by membership of the EEC would be of this character, with different political forms doubtless from those prevailing during the Act of Union period, but with the reality substantially the same.

These then are some of the political implications of Irish membership of the Common Market. We have concentrated on them in this statement because we believe that this is an aspect of the question that has got little public attention in Ireland, even though it is the most important aspect of all. For politics is concerned with the powers and authority of Governments and States; it is concerned with the powers of conscious decision-making which those who govern States possess. A State which proposes to surrender part of its political powers, as must be done on entry to the Common Market, in return for hypothetical advantages that it is hoped will accrue as a result of the "automatic" working of the economic market, is making a very bad bargain; for economic troubles can be endured, but political powers, once surrendered, cannot easily be retracted. A nation, particularly a small nation, that allows itself to be lured into such a surrender, has put itself in grave peril; for it will find itself dependent either on the goodwill of much mightier neighbours, whose political record it has little cause to trust, or on the benevolence of an international bureaucracy over whose activities it has little or no control. Neither of these courses can sensibly commend themselves to a small country like Ireland, which is politically divided, only half independent, and whose governments over almost half a century have been too weak or too conservative to use to the full even such powers as they had got. It is utterly foolish for the present Dublin Government to look with equanimity on the surrender of political power which they refer to when they speak of "accepting to the full the political implications of EEC membership" (Mr. Lynch). What has been written above on what these implications are should serve to demonstrate how tendentious and deceitful has been so much of the pro-Common Market propaganda that has poured on the Irish people for almost a decade now. It should also show that the Irish people are quite unaware of the implications of the course on which the present Dublin Government has embarked upon, or of the conditions of political servitude the country will find itself in unless the Government's present course is widely opposed by a more awakened and alert public opinion. A responsibility rests on every patriotic citizen to seek to bring about such an opinion on this issue.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WHILE the political implications of EEC entry have in general been played down or entirely ignored, a rosy and exaggerated view has frequently been taken of its alleged economic benefits. For these benefits to Irish industry and agriculture are supposed widely to be "automatic" as a result of Irish participation in a wide

"dynamic" Common Market — even though membership of the Common Market would require the Irish Government to surrender to the EEC numerous and vital planning powers, which no country in the economic position of Ireland can afford to abandon. Contrary to what has been widely supposed in Ireland, there is no magic in a large market to ensure the achievement of such desirable ends of economic policy as full employment, a cessation of compulsory emigration or uniform regional development. If there were, such a large "common market" as the United States of America would not have large-scale unemployment, a precipitate abandonment of the countryside by the agricultural population and the problem of blighted and underdeveloped areas, covering in some cases tracts of territory several times the size of Ireland, that were formerly prosperous but are so no longer because of the consequences of the "free" movement of goods, capital and labour. If Ireland joins the EEC there is no reason why we would not become even more of an undeveloped area than we at present are, together with the highlands of Scotland, southern Italy, Brittany and northern Norway, peripheral regions of the EEC, starved of industry and capital, which would be concentrated in the traditional industrial growth centres of Europe, where it would make most profit for its owners. An Irish Government wishing to stop this process — a process whose consequences are easily seen in the USA — would be deprived of many of the necessary tools of economic planning wherewith to do so by the rules of the Common Market.

There is reference in the Rome Treaty to the desirability of "regional economic development" to raise investment and living standards in under-capitalised areas of the Community, and there have been many optimists in Ireland who think that if Ireland were in the EEC much of the country — and possibly the country as a whole — would be treated as an area requiring special treatment and concessions. This again is typical of much Irish wishful-thinking on the EEC; for the Rome Treaty gives no detailed blue-print and contains no actual commitment on the part of the EEC or the member governments to specific regional development projects. Nor are any specific criteria laid down to indicate what areas of the Community should be entitled to special concessions on the grounds of their backward economic position.

What the Treaty does contain is a statement in the preamble to the effect that member governments will strive to achieve harmonious economic development "by reducing the differences between the various regions and by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured." It is a splendid sentiment, but it leads to no specific commitment either by member governments or by the Community organs to any particular measure of regional development policy. Regional planning on a Community level has in fact amounted to date to little more than the carrying out of "studies" of various problem areas. It would be rash for Irish people to think that the harsh effects of the EEC on Ireland would be mitigated for us

because we would be regarded as an "underdeveloped region." In a report issued last year the EEC Commission itself pointed out that the poorer and less developed regions of the Community had become relatively poorer still since the establishment of the Common Market. "Disparities between certain regions of the Community," it says, "have continued to get worse, some getting the full benefit of economic growth, while some of the least developed, or the hardest hit by technological change, remain to a great extent unaffected by that growth." It is a fair and honest warning.

IRISH INDUSTRY AND THE COMMON MARKET

IRISH industry has little to gain from the EEC. What it can expect is increased competition on the Irish home market from EEC exporters who would have free access there once Ireland became a member. There are those who argue (e.g. the N.I.E.C. Report on Full Employment) that it would be British exporters to Ireland whom the European competition would mainly injure. If this were so, it would be in a situation where foreign imports had displaced the bulk of native manufactures on the Irish home market — not a very pleasant prospect for those who seek to develop a significant industrial economy in Ireland which could give employment at home to all of the Irish people who want it.

For the fact of the matter is that there is scarcely an industry in Ireland which would have any inherent advantage over those of the other members of a Common Market of ten nations (the Six, Britain, Denmark, Norway and Ireland). A market of 200-300 million people would suit the needs of the giant firms that dominate the modern boom industries. But most Irish manufacturers, catering primarily for a market of 3-4 million people on the geographical periphery of Europe, would in time be put out of business by the competition of cheaper imports; for there are few items of manufacture consumed in Ireland today that could not be produced more cheaply elsewhere, either in the EEC or elsewhere in the world. To some this is an argument for allowing substantial sections of Irish industry to be sacrificed and accepting that the displaced workers should emigrate abroad where they can find employment. But this is not a solution acceptable to those who want to build an independent and prosperous Irish nation. It must be recognised that only in an expanding industrial arm can the numbers who leave the Irish countryside, as well as the natural increase in population, expect to find employment. Importing manufactures from abroad may in many cases be cheaper than producing them in Ireland, but this price differential has to be offset against the social costs in unemployment, emigration, family disruption and regional decay of shutting down on home production. Ireland is a small country, but it has the resources to produce goods and services in quantity and quality enough to satisfy the

most important needs of its people. The fact of the country's small size, however, makes it all the more important that the powers, actual and potential, of the State should be used to the full as a means of industrialisation. Hence the wholehearted and indiscriminate embracing of a free trade policy by the Twenty Six County Government in recent years is likely to be seen in time as a serious error in policy, forced on the Government here by external pressure, especially from the United Kingdom, and which the Government lacked sufficient will and political determination to oppose.

No country has ever industrialised itself under free trade, with the exception of Britain itself, which did so because it was first in the field. It is certainly not possible for a country in the underdeveloped state of Ireland to do so, especially when it is situated next door to giant industrial countries which are in an easy position to annihilate its young industries once protective measures are done away with. Protection has got a bad press in Ireland in recent years, and undoubtedly its indiscriminate and inefficient use can lead to losses as well as gains for a community. But to undertake a commitment to complete free trade in manufactures—as Ireland has done in relation to Britain and as it is proposed to do in relation to the EEC—is likely to prove even more inimical to our industrialisation efforts in the long term. It is difficult for a nation contiguous to the monopoly-dominated industrial powers to embark on a substantial industrialisation programme as such a programme is bound to be looked askance at by those powers; it is utopian to suggest that it can be done under a regime of complete free trade with those very industrial powers. Hence the vital importance for industrialisation of having an independent government which is strong, determined, nationally minded, able and willing to insist politically on the country's right to maintain for an indefinite period—and certainly until the aim of national full employment is attained—the protective and economic planning measures that would have to be abandoned in a free trade system. The Governments in this part of the country in recent decades have unfortunately not been of this character. Their policies and the predominant attitudes of their members have only too clearly shown a loss of faith in the possibility of winning genuine national independence for Ireland and of constructing an economy able to provide full employment at decent living standards. Our Governments have effectively become wedded to the concept of economic, and inevitably political, "integration" with Britain and with the EEC. This has been presented to the Irish public with considerable propagandist expertise as a worth-while goal for the nation; but in reality it is tantamount to national capitulation. Its exponents, whether among our political leaders or the civil service, must inevitably be pliant to foreign political and economic pressure; they are certainly not the people who would be taken seriously abroad as tough bargainers or determined protagonists of their country's interests. Hence the disastrous character of the foreign trade policy the

Dublin Government has embarked upon, with its signature of the Free Trade Agreement with Britain and the ignominious character of its courting of the EEC. Our rulers and planners have interpreted the consequences of their political weakness as the expression of immutable economic laws. They are reluctant to admit that it is politics which sets the framework for economic decisions. Not surprisingly then, they would hardly be willing to admit that it is only a socially radical, republican-minded government which could adequately represent the interests of the Irish people to other countries. Yet it is only such a government could expect to be listened to seriously abroad today, and only such a government could realistically insist to the great industrial powers on Ireland's right to use whatever tools and measures were expedient for its industrialisation, even if these conflicted with the free trade policies of those powers. Moreover, it is only such a government could gain the confidence and raise the morale of the people to the extent necessary to enable them sustain the difficulties and meet the problems of such an independent course.

FOREIGN AND STATE INDUSTRY

THERE are those who contend that even if Irish firms are put out of business by competing foreign imports in free trade conditions, whether with Britain or the EEC, this would be compensated for by the tendency of outsiders, particularly American firms, to set up producing in Ireland in order to scale the Common Market's external tariff and produce goods for the European market from Ireland. It is difficult, however, to see why firms of any significance should do this. The main attraction of Ireland for such outsiders would presumably be the pool of relatively cheap labour available here; but this would be counterbalanced by Ireland's greater distance from the main European centres of population to which these firms would presumably be exporting. Irish labour would in any case have to move to these areas as industries declined in Ireland. Why should not outside firms of importance decide to set up in Britain or the continent direct, where they would be near their main markets—and send over recruiting agents to the Irish towns offering guaranteed employment in their continental factories if they are short of labour? Would not this be a more rational and likely procedure than to set up in Ireland in the first place?

For it must be remembered, of course, that the grants, tax reliefs and other aids which the Irish Government at present offers to attract foreign industry to Ireland would have to go if Ireland were in the EEC. Indeed already they have to go under the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement (by 1975 in general and by 1983 in the case of Shannon). They might have to be dismantled well before these dates if Ireland entered the EEC.

For an essential economic principle of the Common

Market, stemming from its laissez-faire basis, is hostility to state aids to industry, even though these are essential for any country trying to industrialise itself. State aids of all kinds—investment grants, adaptation grants, interest-free or low-interest loans, tax remissions, subsidised plants, factories, machinery, power supplies, training allowances etc.—invariably contain some element of subsidy from public funds. They thus interfere with the principles of free competition quite as much as tariffs and quotas do, and as such they are outlawed by the Rome Treaty and have to be dismantled by countries signing that Treaty over a period. They may be permitted by the EEC Commission in the case of weak industries, or for purposes of “rationalisation of industry,” but no principles are laid down to indicate what cases these shall be. For in practice the Common Market relies on competition to restructure industry in Europe; and in so far as the EEC organs attempt to restructure industry on a European scale, it will mean so far as Ireland is concerned that the relevant decisions will be taken outside the country by people who have interests other than the welfare of Ireland guiding their actions.

The Common Market rules of competition also entail that Government tenders will have to be publicised on a Community basis, thus ruling out the possibility of Government discrimination in this area in favour of nationals and against non-nationals. This would put paid to the hopes of some Irish businessmen that at least the Government and State companies would be able to go on buying their goods in the face of competition from cheaper foreign products. Discriminatory taxation on property purchased by non-nationals would also have to go. There would be no possibility of imposing restrictions on the manufacture of goods for the home market by non-nationals. It would in fact not be possible for an Irish Government to protect the bulk of Irish industry and services, and an indefinite quantity of Irish land, from passing into the hands of non-Irish people. The country could in time be literally bought up by foreigners and it would not be possible for the Irish Government to interfere in any way under the rules of the Common Market. One does not have to be a xenophobe to want to oppose this.

FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR

FREE movement of capital is as basic to the Common Market as free movement of goods. This means that if Ireland entered the Common Market the incentives the Irish Government offers to attract foreign development capital to the country would have to be dismantled over a transition period. It also means that it would not be possible for an Irish Government to curtail the export of Irish capital and savings abroad, except in a balance of payments crisis. Such capital, the “surplus” of the

Irish economy, must be allowed to move abroad with complete freedom, where it would earn a higher rate of return for its owners, no matter how deleterious this was to the Irish economy. This free movement of Irish capital abroad is the main cause of the low rate of investment in the Irish economy since the establishment of the State, and of the consequent inadequate industrialisation, high unemployment and emigration. The Common Market arrangements would make it impossible to change this situation; it would in fact make the shortage of capital in Ireland worse by reducing the attractiveness of Ireland as a sphere of investment for non-Irish capital because of the necessity of dismantling the inducements referred to above.

Where there is free movement of goods and capital, there will necessarily be free movement of labour. The C.I.O. survey teams on the impact of free trade on Irish industry found that a drop of 6% in employment would occur in the industries examined—which covered some 78% of Irish industrial employment—even after they had been considerably adapted. Under the Common Market arrangements these workers would be “free” to move to France, Germany, Italy, etc., as they are now free to move to Britain. Some of them might be assisted by the Common Market Social Fund for meeting half the cost of retraining and resettling displaced workers, in connection with which some exaggerated claims have been made in Ireland. But, as mentioned previously, the sums available under this Fund are derisory and unlikely to assist the Irish Government to any significant extent in financing the emigration of disemployed Irish workers and their families.

There can be no doubt but that the Common Market would aggravate rather than alleviate our emigration problem. In a market economy labour must follow capital; and where a national government has no power to control the export of capital, its efforts to eliminate the emigration of labour must be without success.

Among other consequences of Irish Common Market membership are that it would rule out the possibility of an Irish Government using changes in the exchange rate between the Irish and British pounds—similar to that between the Australian and British pounds for example—as an economic planning measure relevant to the aim of obtaining full employment in Ireland. This is because the EEC’s common agricultural policy fixes farm prices in European dollars rather than in national currencies, so that devaluation of the national currency would lead to a corresponding increase in home food prices and hence in the cost of living and production, and so be self-defeating.

Common Market membership would also require Ireland to adopt the so-called “added value tax” which is now being introduced in all the EEC countries. This is a highly regressive form of purchase tax falling most heavily on the poorest classes, and would accentuate even further the already very regressive character of the Irish taxation system. The common external tariff of

the EEC would also affect Irish imports of raw materials for industry from countries outside the Common Market. In 1965 Ireland imported raw materials worth about £50 million from countries other than the Six, Britain, Denmark and Norway. By joining the Common Market we would have to abide by the Common Market's external tariff on many of these raw materials even though this might not be in the interests of our industrialists in various areas. A further effect of membership would be the considerable rise in food prices for consumers in Ireland as a consequence of adopting the Common Market's agricultural policy. The housewife could expect to spend up to 6s. 9d. a pound for butter, for example. Higher food prices, together with the effect on prices of the added value tax, would significantly curtail the purchasing power of the incomes of Irish housewives and the urban working class.

IRISH AGRICULTURE AND THE COMMON MARKET

IRISH entry to the Common Market offers better prospects to Irish agriculture than to Irish industry; but it does so to an Irish agriculture that will have a rapidly and continuously falling population, as is envisaged for all Common Market countries. For despite the higher agricultural prices offered in the Common Market for some agricultural products, it is envisaged by the EEC Commission that in the period 1965-1971 there will be a drop in the EEC agricultural labour force of 17%. A better deal for Irish farmers in the Common Market thus by no means would entail the maintenance of the Irish rural population even at its present level; and the difficulties inevitable for Irish industry would make it impossible for the rural surplus to be absorbed there, indicating a continuance of high rural emigration abroad.

The better deal for Irish agriculture in the Common Market has, however, been greatly exaggerated in Ireland. It is based on the fact that the prices for agricultural products in the EEC are related more closely to the costs of their production than are agricultural prices in our present main market, Great Britain, where most Irish agricultural products, with the exception of cattle, have now to be sold below their costs of production at home. But not all agricultural prices are higher in the Common Market than in Ireland; prices for wheat and sugar-beet are lower there, for example. Moreover, even though the EEC prices for cattle and milk are considerably higher than those at present prevailing on the British market, it must be remembered that the prospects of greatly enlarged Irish exports of these products to the Six in the event of Ireland and Britain joining are not that strong. For the Six EEC countries are almost self-sufficient as it is in the goods which constitute our main

agricultural exports, being supplied by the highly efficient and low-cost farmers of Holland and France, and they in fact have exportable surpluses of dairy products.

The EEC is at present 98% self-sufficient in beet-sugar; it is 95% self-sufficient in its beef requirements; it is wholly self-sufficient, and indeed produces large surpluses, in milk, butter and cheese. The prospects of substantial Irish agricultural exports to the Six on Irish entry to the EEC are therefore small—with the possible exception of a share of the 5% of beef requirements, and at present the EEC is rapidly building up its cattle stocks to become wholly self-sufficient in this area also if possible.

The situation thus boils down to this: that the main advantage of Common Market membership for Ireland is the safeguarding of the existing trade in agricultural goods, and especially cattle, with Britain—something which we are supposed to have been ensured by the terms of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement signed by the Irish and British Governments in London in January 1966; an Agreement which—even though it was a very bad bargain for the Irish Government to agree to, and its consequences are already being felt in closures, dumping and unemployment in the tyre and motor assembly industries—the British Government nevertheless now proposes to break little more than a year later, unless Ireland agrees to accompany the U.K. into the far worse situation of the Common Market.

For Britain is one of the main importers of food in Europe and if she enters the Common Market the self-sufficiency of the resulting enlarged Community would be considerably less than at present. An enlarged Community of 10 nations, including Britain, would produce 80% of its sugar beet requirements instead of 98%, and 92% of its beef requirements instead of 95%; but it would be less self-sufficient because of Britain's needs as a major food-importing nation rather than because of any great expansion of demand for food on the continent. Indeed the Common Market's high food prices, while acting as a stimulus to production, serve to restrict food consumption rather than encourage it. As regards mutton, lamb, pig-meat, cheese and butter the main advantage of Ireland's entry to the Common Market would be the preservation of our share in the British market for these products, and the expectation of higher prices than at present on this market as a result of the change from the British system of price supports by deficiency payments to the continental system of price supports by import levies.

Yet, under Articles 1 and 8 of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement the British Government commits itself to continuing to take Ireland's agricultural exports in the event of such a change being made "at a level not less than that achieved during a recent representative period prior to the introduction of the arrangement in question, and to afford opportunities for the growth of such imports from Ireland which would be proportionately not less favourable than are allowed under the (proposed new)

arrangement for supplies to the United Kingdom market from any source, including producers in the United Kingdom, covered by the arrangement."

This was no very generous concession which Britain made to Ireland under the Free Trade Agreement; but one does not have to hold that the Free Trade Agreement was a good Agreement (it most certainly was not) in order to point out that the above clauses of that Agreement represent a specific commitment by Britain to treat Irish agricultural exports in a particular way if Britain should change over to the EEC system of price supports for farmers. What is happening at the present time is that Britain is in effect threatening to break the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement unless Ireland agrees to apply to enter the Common Market with her. This, of course, amounts to an intolerable pressure on the Dublin Government — even though that Government is partly responsible for its own plight by having agreed to sign the Free Trade Agreement in the first place, despite minority warning voices at the time—and this pressure should be exposed as such and countered.

Ireland has had sad experience of treaties and agreements being broken by British Governments (the previous Trade Agreement was broken unilaterally by Britain only three years ago), and Irish Governments have known decades of British economic and political pressure. The time has not yet come, however, when Irish people who want to see Ireland forge an independent trading and commercial policy, must meekly acquiesce in the face of such pressure, remain silent and unprotesting in the face of this repeated double-dealing by Britain, and mutely agree to allow the country to be served up as if it were on a platter to the British Government—as is evidenced by our synchronised EEC application — who will make whatever arrangements suit Britain's interests so far as Ireland and the Common Market are concerned. For this is the reality behind our "independent" EEC application and our Government's pallid enthusiasm for "undertaking the great task of building the new Europe" (Mr. Lynch) together with "our friends in the United Kingdom."

WHY IRELAND SHOULD NOT JOIN THE EEC

THE above appraisal of the main political and economic effects on Ireland of Common Market membership should convince most people who are able to objectively examine the question that this would be a disastrous step for Ireland to take. Common Market membership would mean the relinquishing of control of our political and economic destiny, abandonment of what independence the country possesses and surrender by the Dublin

Government of the principal powers it has to develop a viable economy in Ireland capable of providing a decent living for the people. It would mean committing not only this generation of Irish people, but also future generations, to entering a political and economic bloc dominated by States and interests that in no way have the welfare and progress of the Irish people as their concern.

There are many government measures and planning powers essential to building a national economy. They include the use of tariffs, quotas, grants to private industry, the development of public enterprise, differential taxation arrangements, control of capital movements, credit control, the development of trade relations with the rest of the world. All of these powers would either have to be surrendered wholly or drastically modified on entry to the Common Market. The Dublin Government has already agreed to abandon protection for Irish industry through tariffs and quotas in relation to Britain. By entry to the EEC it would have to do the same in relation to the EEC countries. Common Market membership would mean that Ireland would surrender its power to diversify its trade with other countries, for under Articles 110-116 of the Rome Treaty all commercial agreements with Common Market countries have to be concluded by the EEC Council. Control of Irish capital exports would become impossible, although this is essential to prevent the investment of Irish savings abroad. The effective development of state industry would become impossible, as this always entails an element of subsidy and this is against the Common Market rules of competition. The Government would lose the power of giving special grants and assistance to its own nationals as against foreigners. It would be impossible to keep effective control and ownership of Irish land and industry in the hands of Irish people. In sum then, the Common Market would commit the country not only to free movement of goods, capital and labour on a European-wide scale, but to the abandonment of those public economic planning powers which are essential to counter the drawbacks of the free movement of goods and the abolition of tariffs and quotas.

This latter is an aspect of Common Market membership that has not received the attention that is its due from the Irish labour and trade union movement, which has always emphasised the importance of public planning and governmental action as essential if there is to be sufficient productive investment to secure full employment for the labour force.

BRITAIN'S THREAT TO BREAK ANOTHER TREATY

THE examination in this statement of the political implications of Irish Common Market membership shows

that it is very much contrary to our national interests to join. The examination of the economic implications shows that the main argument in favour of Common Market membership for Ireland is the need for continued access to the British market for our agricultural exports. Yet it has been mentioned above that under the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement the British and Irish Governments pledged themselves to establish a free trade area between the two countries. The British Government in particular guaranteed to allow access for Irish cattle to the British market. When, therefore, the British Government decides to join the Common Market following Mr. Wilson's "probes," it is bound under the Free Trade Agreement to ensure continued access for our exports and to make the requisite arrangements for this in its negotiations with the EEC; or else to appropriately indemnify the Irish Government for breaking the Agreement.

It should be clearly understood that this statement is in no way to express or imply approval of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement which was, and remains, a very bad bargain for the Dublin Government to have made, which is having and would have disastrous consequences for industrial employment in Ireland even if the Common Market issue had never arisen, and whose revision the Irish Government would be perfectly justified in demanding, now that Britain has brought about an entirely new and dangerous situation for Ireland by her decision—which certainly had not been made when the Free Trade Agreement was signed in January 1966—to apply to join the Common Market. But it does stress the necessity for the Irish Government at the present time to put the maximum pressure on Britain to preserve our main exports to the British market, in return for which we annually take many millions of pounds more of British exports, and to use Britain's commitments under the Free Trade Agreement as a main political weapon to hand in doing so. In other words, we should adopt the same position as such countries as Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Portugal, who have got free trade agreements with Britain, but who are unwilling to follow her into the EEC—in contrast to our Government's rash subservience.

It is important to appreciate the aggressive character vis-a-vis Ireland of a British decision to apply for Common Market membership without a clear statement of its intentions to fulfil its obligations under the terms of the Free Trade Agreement. Effectively, what would happen if Britain decides to apply for membership of the EEC is that Mr. Wilson's Government would be saying to Ireland: If we apply for membership of the EEC it will mean that we may break the Free Trade Agreement signed last year; but if you apply also we will not break the Agreement. And what would happen if Ireland applies for EEC membership along with Britain, which the Government here wants to do, and is turned down? The carrying-out of the Free Trade Agreement would be made conditional on Ireland applying for EEC membership along with Britain and on being admitted along

with Britain. Unless, that is, the British Government seeks to carry out its obligations under the Free Trade Agreement when it is negotiating with the EEC.

This is an aspect of the matter which has almost entirely escaped comment in Ireland, although it goes to the political heart of the question. It must therefore be made clear to the Irish people, and the Irish Government has a duty to hammer it home to the British Government—as Britain's EFTA partners, who are in a similar position, are currently doing—that the British Government is obliged to ensure continued access of Irish goods to the British market under the terms of last year's Agreement; and that Ireland is under no obligation to become a member of the Common Market also in order to ensure this freedom of access. It must be pointed out that Ireland has undertaken no commitment to the British Government to join the Common Market if Britain joins. There is no reference to the Common Market in the published text of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, and when that Agreement was signed there was no indication that the British Government intended to initiate again an approach to the EEC, which was not decided until a year later.

In the light of these facts it is difficult to understand the Taoiseach's statement, reported in the newspapers to have been made at his press conference on April 30th, to the effect that "there was an arrangement in the Free Trade Agreement that Ireland and the United Kingdom would seek Common Market membership together."

In 1966, the British Government, having unilaterally broken the previous Trade Agreement (in October 1964) pressured the Irish Government into accepting the Free Trade Agreement which, in return for the dismantlement of protection on Irish industry over a period of years, guaranteed the free entry of Irish agricultural goods to the British market "for all time," as the Irish public were then assured; and guaranteed to accept unlimited supplies of store cattle, Ireland's most important single export. "For all time" now turns out to have meant "until Britain joins the Common Market!"

THE SHORT-TERM ALTERNATIVE

THE short-term alternative to following Britain into the EEC when the Wilson Government applies for membership is for the Irish Government to insist on Britain carrying out her obligations under the Free Trade Agreement, while Ireland seeks to adapt her economy for this new unexpected turn by demanding an immediate revision of that Agreement.

This would necessitate a sustained and forceful diplomatic campaign by the Irish Government and a measure of initiative and imagination in our foreign policy which the country has not had since the 1930s. We would not be unique in contemplating such a course,

however, as it is what is being done at the moment by some of Britain's EFTA partners, notably Switzerland and Sweden. These are countries which, like Ireland, have got free trade agreements with Britain; they are heavily dependent on exports to Britain and the EEC. Yet neither of them has applied for EEC membership and they are extremely reluctant to do so because of the political implications of such a step. Even though Switzerland is bordered on three sides by EEC countries, and on the fourth side by Austria, which is negotiating an association agreement with the EEC, the Swiss Government is unlikely, even if Britain joins the Common Market, to become a member. These and other EFTA countries are at present pressing the British Government, publicly and through diplomatic channels, to ensure continued access for their goods to Britain if Britain joins the Common Market. This is the political and diplomatic position Ireland should adopt vis-a-vis the British Government during the present period, instead of a pusillanimous accommodation to every twist and turn of British policy that has marked the Dublin Government's foreign relations for over a decade now.

The sensible course, therefore, in the present situation would be for the Dublin Government to withdraw its application for membership of the Common Market — it was folly from the first and the Irish people, if they knew what it would commit the country to, would certainly not approve of it — and, on Britain applying for EEC membership, the Irish Government should carry out a sustained political campaign to make clear to Irish and British public opinion the obligations of the British Government under the Free Trade Agreement, and to put the British Government under the maximum pressure to fulfil those obligations in its negotiations with the EEC. Moreover, the Irish Government, in order to meet this new and difficult situation, should demand an immediate revision of the Free Trade Agreement so as to expunge from it those clauses which could inhibit the industrialisation of the country, and particularly the commitment by Ireland to the total dismantling of industrial protection over the next eight years. As Britain's second best European customer, buying from Britain far more than she buys from us, an Irish Government adopting such a course would have some strong trade cards to play. The Dublin Government should be pressed to adopt this course at the present time.

Such a course would call for considerable political courage and flexibility on the part of the Irish authorities and, naturally but unfortunately, it would be made all the more difficult by the attitude of uncritical courtship of Britain and the Common Market which has prevailed in Irish Government circles and among vocal sections of Irish opinion in recent years. But the difficulties in changing to a good policy are no reason for persisting in a bad one. The trend of the Government's present policies is bound to arouse the alarm of the mass

of the Irish people before long, as their implications for our national independence become clearer. They will then be rejected and have to be altered; but the longer they are persisted in the more harm they will have done. If policies of courage and vision can come from any circles among the present Government, it is better that they should come now than when the country has suffered more.

New Zealand also is a country whose situation is similar to that of Ireland. She exports 75% of her agricultural production and 50% of her total exports to the British market—which is less than we do. Yet the British Government has been forced to pledge itself to secure continued access to Britain for the most important New Zealand products in the event of Britain joining the Common Market. In the words of Mr. Wilson, speaking in the House of Commons debate on the British application on May 8th, "in our negotiations with the Community the problem of New Zealand must be dealt with on a realistic and imaginative basis." He listed various possible methods for maintaining access for New Zealand's products to the British market even when Britain was in the EEC and stated "Whatever the method this aim is one where we have a bounden duty to seek the necessary safeguards." In the light of this public commitment, made on such an important occasion, it is highly unlikely that Britain can later back out of her obligations to New Zealand even if she wants to do so in order to join the EEC. One may well ask: why does not the Irish Government seek to obtain a similar guarantee from the British Government, and similar arrangements, instead of "letting Britain off the hook" by our applying for EEC membership. It rather looks as if Mr. Wilson says to the New Zealanders: we will make the requisite arrangements to secure your continued access to our markets even if we join the EEC, but has said to Mr. Lynch: if you do not seek to join the EEC together with us we will break our trade agreement with you so that you will not be able to export any longer your agricultural products. But did Mr. Lynch seek the arrangement the New Zealanders have obtained?

A TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE EEC; THE ASSOCIATION CONCEPT

IN the event of Britain becoming a member of the EEC the Irish Government should negotiate a commercial agreement with the EEC to engage in trade on mutually advantageous terms, similar to the agreements that the EEC has negotiated with many countries. The Irish Government should refuse to consider submitting to any abandonment of legal sovereignty or of those planning powers necessary for industrialisation which would be entailed by EEC membership. The main aim of an Irish Government in negotiating such an agreement, would be to secure as favourable outlets for

our exports, and particularly our agricultural exports, in Europe as possible, without being tied by undesirable political strings.

Some Irish commentators have suggested that Ireland should seek to obtain an Association Agreement with the Common Market rather than membership — there is no such status as “associate membership”. Association agreements have been worked out by the Common Market with various countries, with Greece, Turkey, Nigeria and the former French colonies in Africa. At present an association agreement is being negotiated with Austria; and Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Spain have applied for association. There are no criteria laid down in the Rome Treaty governing the character of association agreements. They differ from country to country and the associated countries are grouped together in a Council of Association with the EEC. In theory the EEC and the associated country has a veto on whatever is decided in the Council of Association in carrying out the agreement. In practice effective veto rights depend on relative political and economic strengths, and the associated country as the weaker partner is extremely unlikely to be willing to use its veto for fear of retaliatory vetoes by the stronger EEC. Moreover, where issues cannot be decided on a Council of Association, it is the EEC which effectively has the last word. In the case of the association agreements between the EEC and Greece and Turkey, for example, when the representatives of the EEC and the State concerned cannot agree, then it is the Court of Justice of the Community, on which the associated State has no representation or influence, which decides the issue. The association agreements signed by the Common Market with Greece and Turkey commit these latter to full membership eventually, after a longer period of transition to full free trade than in the case of members; and the association agreements signed between the EEC and the African countries have been widely criticised in Africa as devices for maintaining the former colonies as primary-producing appendages of Western Europe, effectively robbed of their powers to develop their infant industries and industrialise themselves.

An association agreement between Ireland and the Common Market that committed this country to eventual full membership would have all the disadvantages, political and economic, that attach to EEC membership and which have been examined in detail in this statement. There seems in fact to be no particular advantage in an association agreement which would not attach to an ordinary commercial treaty with the EEC and which it is quite open to the Irish Government to seek to negotiate, as do other countries trading with the EEC that are neither members nor associates. It is also unlikely that an Association Agreement would permit the Irish Government to have full freedom to diversify its trade with third countries, to control capital movements, or to control the establishment of foreign enterprises in

Ireland—all of which are vital to a policy of maintaining our political and economic independence.

An ordinary commercial agreement with the Common Market would enable Ireland to maintain her freedom to diversify her trade outlets with countries other than Britain or the EEC, and would enable the Irish Government to retain its essential planning powers over the economy. By not joining the EEC, Ireland would have no say in the workings of the EEC Council, Commission and Parliament; but the examination of the composition of these bodies and the likely numerical apportionment of Irish representation on them in the event of our joining, should show that we would have minimal influence. By not joining we would also lose the benefit of the various Community funds, but these in practice are either schemes to assist emigration (The Social Fund), increase Ireland's foreign indebtedness (loans from the European Investment Bank) or “restructure” agriculture (The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund). “Restructuring” agriculture is a euphemism for reducing the rural population and enlarging the size of farms, a process which it is desirable should be controlled by the Irish Government rather than by the European Commission. Finally, by not joining the EEC there would be the danger of Ireland not securing adequate access for our exports to the markets of the EEC countries. But this would be the object of negotiation of the trade agreement suggested above, to secure a satisfactory quid-pro-quo between Ireland and the EEC, and it is the contention of this statement, examined in detail earlier, that the Irish Government could, if it were willing to put the requisite moral and political pressure on the British Government, make it embarrassing and difficult for the latter to slide out of its guarantees of fair access for our goods to the British market, even in the event of Britain joining the EEC, as this is the European market of most importance to us.

So many Irish people have been hypnotised by the Common Market, or have had their critical faculties dulled by the almost unopposed tide of pro-Common Market propaganda that has been loosed on Ireland for the past decade, that they will recoil in alarm from these proposals. The pro-Common Market propaganda has nowhere been more successful than in the way it has convinced so many thinking people that “entry into Europe”, to use the most common catch-phrase, would be a privilege and a benefit to us instead of a piece of egregious governmental folly and a renegation of our national traditions.

THE LONG-TERM ALTERNATIVE

The above proposals are those which an Irish Government with even a modicum of courage and vision would adopt now, recoiling even at this late stage from the sacrifice of independence and loss of control over our national life which Common Market entry would entail.

They are not without difficulties or dangers, but if the realities of the Common Market were made clear to the people, rather than the tendentious half-truths of the propagandists, and if a real lead were given by a courageous government, we need not fear that the Irish people would not respond.

At the same time it is only proper to point out that far more thorough-going and radical measures would be necessary to build up a viable independent economy giving full employment in Ireland and as an alternative to the ignominious policies of "integration" with Britain and the Common Market now being pursued, policies which are tantamount to an abandonment of the aim of building a free and prosperous nation. This is the long-term alternative to the Common Market and to the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement which can only be given to the people by a socially radical, republican-minded Government, which puts the interests of Irish workers and small farmers before the interests of foreign capital. Only such a Government, based on the Republican and Labour Movements, could raise the courage and morale of the Irish people to the extent necessary to tackle the difficult problems that lie in the path to national unity and genuine political and economic independence; only such a Government would get the necessary support from the people, and only such a Government could justifiably call on the people to make the hard sacrifices necessary in achieving such an end. Moreover, it is certain that only such a Government would be listened to and taken seriously abroad and be likely to negotiate fair and beneficial trade agreements with other countries.

It is not the purpose of this statement on the Common Market to elaborate the details of the political and economic policies of such a government, but they would certainly have to include the following if the aim of national independence, full employment and an end to compulsory emigration were to be achieved: (1) Establishment of national control of credit to serve the needs of Irish economic development (2) The repatriation of Irish foreign investments for productive purposes and control of the export of Irish savings (3) Control over foreign capital investment in Ireland and an examination of existing foreign firms with a view to deciding which ones might usefully be taken into public ownership (4) A greatly increased rate of domestic investment in production and manufactures, with the extension of public industry and the allocation of considerably enlarged funds to scientific research and technological development in those areas where Ireland has an economic advantage; a policy of hire the foreign expert rather than bring in the foreign capitalist; the integration of investment decisions into a national plan for full employment and production (5) The use of physical controls on imports and exports where necessary in order to balance our national payments (6) The fostering of a cooperative small-farm agriculture as part of a national food production and

marketing plan, with full state backing for the development of ancillary food processing enterprises (7) A more equitable taxation and social security system to reduce the burden of high investment rates on the weaker sections of the people; an expansion of demand on the home market by an extended social security scheme and increased investment in housing and education to satisfy the most important needs of the people (8) Measures to democratise social life, to involve more and more people in decision-making and in economic and welfare activity at all levels of the economy and administration (9) Vigorous pursuit of trade links with countries other than Britain and the EEC, irrespective of their political or social system, and a considerable extension of bilateral trading agreements with other countries, if necessary involving an element of barterage, in order to avoid the excessive trade imbalances which at present exist between Ireland and most of her trading partners. (10) A whole-hearted commitment by the Government to the aim of restoring the national language and fostering the national culture, as important agencies for enhancing national morale and providing the spiritual driving force for achieving the above aims.

The above policies in turn depend on, and their successful implementation is inextricably bound up with, the winning of the unity of the country; for these policies are as necessary to a solution of the problems of the Northern Six Counties as of the Twenty Six. It should be clear, moreover, that it is only such policies are likely to make any appeal to the mass of the people of the North, and particularly the Protestant sections of the working class, and to wean them from that political loyalty to Britain which is so detrimental to their real interests and which prevents them taking their rightful part with their fellow-countrymen of the South in building an independent and prosperous Irish nation. Only such policies can appeal to the latent social radicalism of the Northerners and overcome that scepticism which they have had for so long towards overtures from conservative political leaders to the south.

THE CULTURAL DANGERS

THIS statement has concentrated on the political and economic dangers to Ireland of entry to the Common Market; but this is not to discount the cultural dangers. It is the main thesis of the statement that an Ireland which is economically integrated with Britain or the EEC will in time also be politically integrated, or left with but the forms of political independence, without the reality. Our cultural independence, the efforts to restore the Irish language, to foster our indigenous cultural traditions, would also be doomed if these political and economic trends are not reversed. The maintenance of the native language and of the cultural tradition of the country has always been an integral part of the struggle for national independence politically and economically. The abandonment of the independence struggle in the political and

economic fields signals its doom also in the cultural.

Some people in Ireland have argued that in an "integrated" Europe Ireland's language and cultural traditions would in some mysterious way come into their own because they would be the one remaining badge of our "identity." But this is mere sophistry, aimed at dulling the fears of those who are alarmed at the effects the sacrifice of political and economic independence would have on the national will to survive as a cultural entity. National "identity" has become the substitute for national independence in the vocabulary of the pro-Common Marketers. But a nation which is independent does not have to worry about its identity; its identity is patent and clear for all to see because its institutions, policies and cultural products are its own and not those of other nations.

There are others who speak of the need for Ireland to become "culturally part of Europe," which is something, of course, that Ireland already is and has never ceased to be in all its long history. Such clichés of the propagandists betray their ignorance or wilful distortion of both history and culture. Ireland, for millenia, except during periods when the country was blighted by foreign misgovernment, has made, as it continues to make, significant contributions to European and to world civilisation. Nor is there such an entity as a European culture that is different and separate from the cultures of the nations that form its part. European culture is the culture of Europe's nations. There is not a work of significance in any of the arts that is not distinctively national in either its form, its content or its inspiration. The destruction of nations by their "integration" in monopoly-dominated economic and political blocs signals the destruction of European culture, not its efflorescence. For Ireland it would mean the destruction of whatever was distinctively Irish in language, in artistic works and in social tradition. With national cultures attenuated, the tawdry products of the international entertainments industry would have a free field—taking advantage no doubt of the economies of large-scale production!—to the greater profit of the monopolists that dominate it. At present the latter have their operations retarded by such barriers as national communities, minority languages, variety of customs and social attitudes, plurality of peoples, diversity of communal psychologies. To the deracinated continental-wide monopolists who are the chief exponents of economic integration, and who finance most of the Common Market propaganda, these things are outdated and dangerous; but they are the roots of European culture. Those who value culture will seek to foster and nourish those roots.

An examination of the cultural implications of Irish Common Market membership should strengthen and confirm opposition based on political and economic grounds.

PULL BACK FROM THE BRINK

IT is, unfortunately, no lurid propagandist fantasy to see striking analogies between the Ireland that would

accede to the Treaty of Rome and the Ireland that saw the passage of the Act of Union of 1800. For the Treaty of Rome would mean for us, not "entering Europe," but entering into ties of closest economic union with Great Britain, a union in which Britain would be the overwhelmingly dominant partner. Such an economic union caused Ireland dreadful sufferings during the nineteenth century. After less than half a century of formally independent statehood in a divided country it is but facing reality to have the gloomiest forebodings about the prospects of entering such an economic union again. In the political sphere the Act of Union saw the passage of legislative power from the Irish Parliament in Dublin to the Imperial Parliament at Westminster. The Treaty of Rome also would take many of the powers of the Irish Parliament, including the main powers of economic policy-making, and transfer them to the Common Market institutions in Brussels. It is true that Brussels is not London; but at least in nineteenth century London there were nearly one hundred Irish representatives in the law-making body to speak up for the Irish constituents that they represented, however inadequately. Who would represent the interests of Ireland in Brussels? The answer is a Government Minister who would have one, or at most, two votes on a Common Market Council of twenty-five or twenty-six—and a dozen or so nominated representatives in a European "Parliament" which has no power to make laws. The nineteenth century political arrangements would rather seem to have the edge on those of the twentieth! It is true, of course, that the Dublin Dail would not lose all its law-making powers as it did in the nineteenth century; but once the basic powers of economic planning are gone, can what is left amount to anything more than a simulacrum of an independent parliament?

If Ireland enters the Common Market it will be turning our backs on the most potent traditions of our history. Moreover, once Ireland became a member it would undoubtedly be very difficult for her to leave the Common Market at a later date. That is why it is so important for the Irish Government to pull back from this course before it has brought the most sorry consequences on the people. For the Government can still pull back. It can either adopt the suggested course of action outlined in this statement or some related course; and, if the situation were fairly and honestly put to the people, the Government would have the support of the mass of the Irish nation in dealing with the difficulties and dangers of a more independent political and economic policy. On the other hand, if the Government is not willing to have second thoughts, and if Britain's application to join the Common Market succeeds and is followed by a successful application from Ireland, there need be no doubt that the Government and the entire basis of its policies will be repudiated by the Irish nation in time. If the present Government leads the Irish people into the Common Market the future will undoubtedly see a

coming together of the mass of the Irish people to repudiate Common Market membership and to establish real independence for the country.

During the coming period all nationally-minded citizens and organisations need to educate themselves on the implications of Common Market membership for Ireland and to organise in order to urge the Government to change its present course. This is true particularly of Irish workers and trade unionists who, with their families, will be the people most adversely affected by Common Market membership. It is true of Irish businessmen, whose firms and enterprises will be decimated by Common Market competition. It is true of the small farmers, for whose hard and difficult condition there is no solution in the EEC, but only the prospect of accelerated rural depopulation, whatever the short-term gains for a minority. It is true of republicans and language workers, whose hopes for an independent and culturally distinctive Ireland will never see fruition in the rootless, cosmopolitan world of the Market. It is true of the church authorities and clergy who do not want to see their flocks ravaged by unemployment and emigration, with secularism and a philistine materialism rampant in the land. It is true of all Irish people who want to see their country united, free and prosperous, able to give a decent living at home to all Irish people who want it, making a distinctive contribution to the culture of mankind, trading freely with all nations, and living on terms of equality and mutual respect with the other states and peoples of Europe.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER READING:

- The European Communities*, Stationery Office, G.P.O., Dublin, 1967. 12s.
- Not With Europe*, William Pickles, London, 1962. 2s. 6d.;
- Britain and Europe: How Much Has Changed?* idem, Blackwells, 1967. 10s. 6d.
- The European Challenge*, Tuairim Pamphlet 11, Dublin, 1963. 2s.
- The Common Market and Common Law*, John Temple Lang, Columbia, 1967.
- The Treaty of Rome*, available from the European Community Information Centre, 27 Merrion Sq., Dublin, 2.

If you want to obtain further information on the consequences of Irish membership of the Common Market, or wish to assist in the work of informing Irish public opinion about these and seeking to change the policy of the Government, you should write to the SECRETARY, WOLFE TONE SOCIETY, c/o 22 Belgrave Road, Dublin, 6. Donations are requested to meet the expenses of printing information and briefing material; they will be gratefully received and acknowledged.

ASSESSMENT 1

**LABOUR
AND THE
REPUBLICAN
MOVEMENT**

by George Gilmore

**1/6 from Republican
Publications**

Title: The Case Against the Common Market

Organisation: Sinn Féin [Pre 1970], Wolfe Tone Society

Date: 1967

Downloaded from the Irish Left Archive.

Visit www.leftarchive.ie

The Irish Left Archive is provided as a non-commercial historical resource, open to all, and has reproduced this document as an accessible digital reference. Copyright remains with its original authors. If used on other sites, we would appreciate a link back and reference to the Irish Left Archive, in addition to the original creators. For re-publication, commercial, or other uses, please contact the original owners. If documents provided to the Irish Left Archive have been created for or added to other online archives, please inform us so sources can be credited.